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This paper concerns a series of “renditions” of ethnically Japanese, German and Italian internees 
from their countries of residency in Latin America to the custody of the United States during the 
Second World War which were enacted through the framework of the Good Neighbor Policy. 
Despite many revisionist popular and scholarly contentions that the Good Neighbor Policy was 
an inauthentic application of the rhetoric that it aspired to, which traditionally cast the United 
States’ relations with Latin America as characterized by an attitude of respectful rapprochement 
premised on mutual recognition of autonomy, this paper instead uses the case of the “renditions” 
to argue that Latin America’s diplomatic influence was at least on par with that of the United 
States during the Good Neighbor Policy, even under the stresses of wartime conditions. 
However, I also argue that the mutual influence that the Good Neighbor Policy afforded to the 
United States and Latin America in the context of the “renditions” did not universally benefit 
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“M. Nottebohm appears in any event not to have lost, or not validly to have lost, his 
German nationality.”1 Thus did the International Court of Justice determine that Friedrich 
Nottebohm, a man who claimed citizenship in Liechtenstein, had not been illegally transferred to 
the custody of the United States by his resident Guatemala during the Second World War, and 
dismissed a case that may otherwise have had knotty implications for the determination of 
national identity. The ramifications of the Nottebohm Case have doubtlessly invoked much 
discussion and debate within the purview of international law, as was evidenced when the case 
arose in my international law course during the preceding semester in spring 2015. However, that 
the Nottebohm Case has proven to be a prominent source of dispute on the role of identity within 
that discipline highlights the significance of extending one’s appraisal to more broadly 
examining the historical circumstances within which the case was situated.  
This paper will concern the rendition of ethnically Japanese, German and Italian residents 
of assorted Latin American countries to the wartime custody of the United States as enemy 
aliens, conducted under the auspices of the Good Neighbor Program during the period of United 
States involvement in the Second World War (1942-45). Additionally, the paper will examine 
the use of these detainees in prisoner exchanges with the Axis powers and later postwar 
“repatriations” to the defeated combatant states from 1942-48.2 I employ the terminology 
“rendition” and “Good Neighbor renditions” to the case-study of the wartime deportation and 
internment of those Latin American residents perceived to have ethnic ties to the principal Axis 
                                                          
1 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala): Judgments of November 18th, 1953 (Preliminary Objection) and 
April 6th, 1955 (Second Phase of the Case) (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 1955). 
2 Tetsuden Kashima, Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2011), 305-314. 
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powers in order to consciously evoke comparisons to issues of contemporary relevance.3 Using 
such terminology is quite appropriate to examining the phenomena associated with these wartime 
policies, since it corresponds to a central tenet articulated herein: that what occurred in the 
applicable cases was the mutual product of the United States’ and Latin America’s ambitions to 
secure certain social, political and economic gains. In this regard, “rendition” and “Good 
Neighbor renditions” are also appropriate terminologies inasmuch as they have come to imply a 
mutual arrangement between countries to transport and detain prisoners therebetween in the 
contemporary context, which is a crucial aspect of the policies that oft-used past terms such as 
“deportation” do not always adequately convey in and of themselves. 
The utility of characterizing these policies as “Good Neighbor renditions” is 
demonstrated by such terminology’s distinct applicability to discerning the nature of the broader 
framework of diplomatic initiatives that informed them: the Good Neighbor Policy. Due to many 
of the historical debates surrounding the content and character of the Good Neighbor Policy, 
there are often disputes over whether it either represented an assertion of United States 
realpolitik over the American continents with a veneer of idealistic showmanship or composed a 
genuine rapprochement with Latin America embodying liberal values. Scholars of the former 
persuasion may be especially inclined to allege that the deported internees were rendered to US 
custody as a principal result of diplomatic pressure by the United States. However, such case-
studies as the discriminatory attitudes toward the Japanese in Peru, the lend-lease materials 
sought in Colombia, the security concerns prevalent in Costa Rica, and the land reform goals 
                                                          
3 John Christgau, Enemies: World War II Alien Internment (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 182-
183; Heidi Gurcke Donald, We Were Not The Enemy: Remembering the United States’ Latin-American Civilian 
Internment Program of World War II (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2008): While using variations of the term “rendition” 
is not completely novel, since John Christgau fleetingly uses the term “rendered” when describing the Good 
Neighbor renditions and thereby actively invokes a comparison with the contemporary occurrence of extraordinary 
renditions in the context of the Global War on Terror, and former internee Heidi Gurcke Donald also makes similar 
comparisons to post-9/11 phenomena, I maintain that my consistent application of this moniker is fairly unique 
among scholarship on these events. 
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pursued in Guatemala should affect an understanding that many Latin American governments 
were quite willing to comply with US requests, with the caveat that this occurred at least partly 
on their own terms and granted them complementary benefits. This information is accompanied 
by the knowledge that not every Latin American government necessarily rendered internees to 
US custody, but either opted to maintain their own domestic internment programs or did not 
collaborate with the United States at all on this aspect of wartime policy. In consequence, I assert 
that it is more reasonable to contend that Latin Americans at least played a mutually critical role 
in voluntarily facilitating the Good Neighbor renditions. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that the United States’ principal goals converged with Latin American desires to 
profoundly shape the contours of the Good Neighbor renditions, but this interaction of interests 
was conditioned by specific circumstances on a case-by-case basis. By investigating the Good 
Neighbor renditions, I likewise aim to illustrate that, though a genuine spirit of mutual respect 
may have pervaded between the United States and Latin American governments in a manner that 
was authentically characteristic of the rhetoric employed by assertions of the Good Neighbor 
Policy, such benefits did not necessarily extend to residents of the participating Latin American 
countries. 
In the next chapter of my paper, I will examine the case-study of Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala (the Nottebohm Case of 1955) in specific detail, giving a basic overview of the 
particulars of the international legal proceedings between Guatemala and Liechtenstein regarding 
the citizenship of Friedrich Nottebohm. I will examine the case’s unique status as a complex 
historical account of an individual internee’s association with a variety of nationalities and the 
manner in which his preferred nationality conflicted with the outside application of nationality 
by other parties as delineated within a diplomatic context of international law. Upon examining 
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the Nottebohm Case from this perspective, I will proceed to illuminate its appositeness to 
highlighting the dynamics of United States-Latin American diplomatic interactions within the 
context of the Good Neighbor Policy, indicating how they emphasize a mutualistic diplomatic 
relationship between these two regions. Subsequently, I will assert the significance of these 
dynamics by drawing upon the evidential discernments achieved by a close-examination of the 
Nottebohm Case.  
In the second chapter, I will employ United States foreign relations documents to 
illuminate the individual circumstances of US-Latin American interactions contemporary to the 
Good Neighbor renditions in a diverse variety of different countries, from Cuba to Paraguay. 
Examining these documents will afford further insight into Latin American agency over the 
shape and form of the Good Neighbor renditions in the cases in which they participated. It will 
also provide information on countries that opted out of the Good Neighbor renditions to labor the 
point that Latin America remained autonomous from the imposition of United States influence 
over their internal affairs, even in unexpected circumstances. Collectively, the foreign relations 
documents will be presented to emphasize the significant role that Latin American states played 
in mediating the manner in which the Good Neighbor renditions were implemented on a 
selective basis that afforded them a high degree of control over its manifestation. 
In the third chapter, I will examine the various situations that were imposed upon 
internees as a result of the Good Neighbor renditions and, in some cases, subsequent repatriation 
to Axis and post-Axis states. I will engage with the degree to which internees voluntarily 
consented to “repatriation” to the ancestral homelands of their families (i.e. the Rome-Berlin-
Tokyo Axis), return to the Latin American homelands in which they had previously resided, 
residency in the United States, or release to a third-party state as a desired outcome in various 
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cases. Two excellent primary case-studies are the Costa Rican Heidi Gurcke Donald’s We Were 
Not The Enemy and the Peruvian Seiichi Higashide’s Adios to Tears, both of which are personal 
memoirs recounting the wartime experiences of the authors and their families within the context 
of the Good Neighbor renditions.4 In both of these cases, despite their deliberations on the 
matter, the respective internees ultimately opted to remain in the United States following the war, 
where they had been held at the Crystal City camp in Texas. Conversely, other internees settled 
in third-party states or were “repatriated” to their family’s ancestral homelands. Often, internees 
were consigned to these three alternatives due to an apparent inability to re-secure residency in 
the Latin American states wherein they had previously resided.5 The extent and degree to which 
internees found themselves in their ultimate respective circumstances voluntarily or out of 
coercion is a subject worthy of investigation, given its relevance to determining the authenticity 
of the benevolence that was belabored as part of the Good Neighbor Policy. I will analyze the 
resulting personal and diplomatic repercussions of these policies with a cognizance of the 
nationality complications that occurred as a result of the Good Neighbor renditions, while using 
these accounts to further corroborate the overarching idea that the Good Neighbor renditions 
were a mutualistic endeavor on the part of the United States and Latin American countries. 
However, I will use this chapter in particular to help deconstruct the notion that a diplomatic 
recognition of mutual self-determination in the United States and the respective countries in 
Latin America, despite being emblematic of the Good Neighbor Policy, benefitted everyone that 
was considered a citizen or resident of Latin America. 
                                                          
4 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy; Seiichi Higashide, Adios to Tears: The Memoirs of a Japanese-Peruvian 
Internee in U.S. Concentration Camps (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2000). 
5 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala): Judgments of November 18th, 1953 (Preliminary Objection) and 
April 6th, 1955 (Second Phase of the Case) (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 1955), 25. 
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I will segue into my concluding epilogue by summarizing my intervention in the overall 
historiography on the Good Neighbor renditions and their implications for determining the actual 
attributes that were definitive of the Good Neighbor Policy. By reviewing the variety of evidence 
that I have recounted in other chapters, I will relate the importance of achieving a comprehension 
of the Good Neighbor renditions that considers Latin America’s role in acting as an active 
facilitator of the wartime policies and their joint role in pursuing the renditions for their own 
unique purposes, even when these activities occurred at the peripheral expense of some other 
Latin Americans, as with the internees. I will situate this crucial context against the broader 
backdrop of United States-Latin American diplomatic relations as a means of demonstrating how 
a mindful incorporation of the insights provided by the Good Neighbor renditions can affect a 
better understanding of the dynamics that have and continue to inform these relations beyond the 
scope of the Good Neighbor Policy. The totality of the evidence will thusly be reviewed to 
demonstrate the overall significance of attaining a more comprehensive awareness of the factors 
that underpinned the Good Neighbor renditions from a historical perspective. 
 In absorbing all of these chapters, it is my intention that readers will become better 
acquainted with the relationship between the United States and Latin America by observing the 
dynamics on display in the Good Neighbor renditions, and that this will help to support an 
awareness that Latin American countries have not invariably been subject to the whims of the 
northern power that has held frequent sway over their affairs in different historical contexts. 
Rather, individualized interests in the respective countries composing the region traditionally 
identified as Latin America have often taken advantage of their relationship with the United 
States to enhance their own status and made acquiescence to United States policy goals 
conditional on the satisfaction of their own desires. Drawing from these informed conclusions, I 
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will highlight the limitations that problematize conceptions of Latin America’s place in the 
international order vis-á-vis the United States as the systemic reflection of a “colonial matrix,” as 
described by the scholar Walter Mignolo, and thereby demonstrate Latin America’s authentic 
sovereignty as a component of the period of the Good Neighbor Policy.6 
 
Chapter One: The Nottebohm Case 
By all accounts, the case of Friedrich Nottebohm attests to the complexity of the 
circumstances that could confront internees of Japanese, German and Italian descent who were 
detained and delivered to United States custody as part of the Good Neighbor renditions. 
Nottebohm was a resident of Guatemala rendered to the United States and interned in Texas who 
claimed a citizenship in Liechtenstein that was affirmed by Liechtenstein’s government, but was 
considered to be a German citizen by the Guatemalans who rendered him.7 Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala, known more informally as the Nottebohm Case, was heard before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1955, and is well-renowned in international legal circles for its 
implications regarding the consideration of nationality. Within the discipline of international law, 
it has been a subject of frequent and persistent contention.8 However, dizzying as the details of 
the case may be, these details reinforce the idea that Latin American states were successful in 
securing foreign acceptance of the notion that residents of Japanese, German and Italian descent 
were a fundamentally unassimilable element in their society, which owed much to a legitimately 
mutualistic culture of quid pro quo between the United States and Latin American countries 
during the era of the Good Neighbor Policy. 
                                                          
6 Walter D. Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), xiii. 
7 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala): Judgments of November 18th, 1953 (Preliminary Objection) and 
April 6th, 1955 (Second Phase of the Case) (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 1955). 
8 Alfred Michael Boll, Multiple Nationality And International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 
110: Specifically, the case has incurred significant controversy over the status of citizenship in international law. 
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In the context of the Nottebohm Case, both of the national litigants sought to achieve a 
tangible improvement in their relative positions resulting from their involvement in the case. The 
government of Liechtenstein sought damages for Guatemala’s wartime activities against 
Friedrich Nottebohm, as well as a restitution of the rights, privileges and properties previously in 
his possession, holding that the actions against him had been wrongful on the basis of his 
ostensive citizenship in Liechtenstein.9 Conversely, the government of Guatemala in turn 
submitted pleas that any applicable reparations should be directed solely to Nottebohm and be 
calculated in accordance with Guatemalan domestic law, associated with their dismissal of the 
notion that Nottebohm had legitimately acquired citizenship in Liechtenstein, in contrast to the 
views held by the government of Liechtenstein.10 However, the “decision” reached by the ICJ in 
1955 as a result of the proceedings associated with Liechtenstein v. Guatemala is more 
accurately characterized as a dismissal. Neither Guatemala nor Liechtenstein could technically 
be said to have explicitly gained from the ICJ’s conclusions, and even less so Nottebohm, the 
hapless subject whose status the case was premised on, since the case was ultimately dismissed 
in a manner that left matters at a status quo ante impasse.11 Nevertheless, the inaction that the 
outcome exhibited was just as, if not more, significant in its political implications, inasmuch as it 
evidenced the reaffirmation of a theretofore implicit consensus regarding the Latin American 
internees who found themselves in thrall of larger geopolitical interests. This consensus 
precluded the notion that Latin American residents perceived to retain ties to their native 
                                                          
9 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 6-7. 
10 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 9-10: Guatemala held that Liechtenstein and the firm of 
Nottebohm Hermanos did not have a case for damages, though Friedrich Nottebohm was personally entitled to 
claiming some damages. Furthermore, the Guatemalan government maintained that it was absolved from 
responsibility on acting in accordance with Decree No. 900, which contained law related to agrarian reform. 
11 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 26: The ICJ determined that Guatemala was not under obligation 
to recognize Liechtenstein’s recognition of Friedrich Nottebohm’s citizenship therein, and that Liechtenstein’s claim 
was therefore inadmissible since Liechtenstein did not have the right to extend diplomatic protection to Nottebohm. 
The court therefore maintained that it was not called upon to deal with any of the other pleas put forward by 
Guatemala or the Conclusions of the Parties besides those which it adjudicated on in this determination. 
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Germany, alongside members of the other minorities targeted as part of the Good Neighbor 
renditions, could lead existences complementary to the vaunted characteristics of a Latin 
America governed by the logic of Latinidad and the overall framework that this nationality 
qualification undergirded. 
At the heart of both the Nottebohm Case and the consensus that it reflected were the 
nationalities alternately projected onto and/or personally endorsed by the individual Friedrich 
Nottebohm. Born in Hamburg, Germany on September 16th of 1881, Nottebohm spent much of 
his young life in Germany in the company of his eight siblings.12 Two years spent in South 
Africa would come to portend an extra-German existence for Nottebohm, which was manifested 
when he moved to Guatemala in 1905 at the age of twenty-four, where he remained for much of 
his life.13 In advance of his arrival in Guatemala, and in collaboration with his brothers, Arturo 
and Juan, Friedrich Nottebohm opened the aptly named firm Nottebohm Hermanos, which 
engaged in commerce and banking, while also devoting a significant subdivision of their 
business to coffee production through their acquisition of several plantation properties from the 
Juan Aparicio family, thereby forming the Compañia de Plantaciones “Cecilia” Limitada. In 
time, the Nottebohm brothers’ operation came to manage one of the most successful coffee 
industries in Guatemala, and indeed in Central America at large, eventually becoming the second 
largest coffee producer in Guatemala by the 1930s.14 
                                                          
12 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 13; Cindy G. Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare: Have We Exorcised 
the Ghosts of WWII Detention Programs or Do They Still Haunt Guantanamo?" in Chicago Kent Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (2011). 
13 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
14 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare"; Regina Wagner, Von Rothkirch, Cristóbal, and Stull, Eric, The History of 
Coffee in Guatemala (Bogotá, Colombia: Villegas Asociados, 2001), 129-130; Christiane Berth, "Aus Hamburg in 
die Kaffee-Welten Zentralamerikas: Die Nottebohm Hermanos in Guatemala," in Aufbruch ins postkoloniale 
Zeitalter: Globalisierung und die außereuropäische Welt in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren, eds. Sönke Kunkel and 
Christoph Meyer (Frankfurt, Germany: Campus Verlag, 2012). 
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The wealth and influence accrued by Friedrich Nottebohm and his brothers in Guatemala 
did not prevent Friedrich from travelling abroad, whether on business or vacation in Germany or 
elsewhere in other countries from 1905-1939. His other brother Dr. Hermann’s newfound 
residence in Liechtenstein prompted Friedrich to make several trips to the small principality from 
1931 onward.15 Friedrich’s ties to Germany by way of his family background and frequent 
visitations preceding the Second World War had already incited a degree of mistrust about him 
on the part of certain parties even prior to the onset of the momentous conflict that would come 
to shape the world at large and Friedrich more personally. During the First World War, 
Nottebohm Hermanos fell under suspicion by the United States government and was resultantly 
registered as an alien enemy by the office of the Alien Property Custodian through the invocation 
of the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), leading to the seizure of its properties in the United 
States. Nottebohm Hermanos filed suit in the United States following the war, and was able to 
regain its properties in a settlement once the United States government had confirmed that the 
firm did not meet the qualifications to be classified as “enemy alien.”16  
One may readily speculate that the legacy of the First World War for the treatment of the 
Nottebohm family and their business interests may have been one motivating factor when 
Friedrich Nottebohm applied for citizenship in Liechtenstein during his travels abroad in Europe 
at the onset of the Second World War. This citizenship was granted via the receipt of his 
certificate of naturalization on October 20th of 1939, and formalized the renunciation of his 
German citizenship.17 Upon eventually returning to Guatemala, Nottebohm informed the 
                                                          
15 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
16 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare.": Following the First World War, the Nottebohms were able to convince the U.S. 
government that only long-term residents of Guatemala had any interest in Nottebohm Hermanos and that the 
company was not an enemy or ally of an enemy as classified by the TWEA. 
17 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare."; Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala): Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Read (The Hague: International Court of Justice, 1955), 48-49: In the dissenting opinion that he appended to the 
case, Judge John Erskine Read posited that evidence indicated that Friedrich Nottebohm naturalized into 
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authorities of his acquired Liechtensteinian citizenship, and this change was initially formally 
acknowledged by Guatemalan authorities.18 While others such as Friedrich’s nephews, Kurt and 
Karl-Heinz Nottebohm, had managed to secure Guatemalan citizenship upon the passage of a 
new law that allowed native-born descendants of foreigners to acquire citizenship in 1938, 
Friedrich himself was ineligible due to his foreign origins and therefore consigned to obtaining 
citizenship elsewhere.19 Unfortunately for Friedrich Nottebohm, obtaining citizenship in 
Liechtenstein was not enough to prevent his detention by Guatemalan authorities and 
subsequently his deportation to the United States in October 1943, following the earlier 
deportation of Kurt and Karl-Heinz to United States custody despite their acquired Guatemalan 
citizenship in January 1943.20 This deportation ensued despite the objections of Liechtenstein, 
whose authorities communicated their affirmation of Friedrich Nottebohm’s citizenship in 
Liechtenstein and their resulting disapproval of Nottebohm’s arbitrary rendition to the United 
States through the Swiss embassy at the time.21  
Friedrich Nottebohm, alongside his nephews, was held at Camp Kenedy in Texas until 
1944, when they were transferred to Fort Lincoln in North Dakota.22 In December 1943, 
Friedrich, Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm were offered a chance at “repatriation” in Germany 
by United States authorities, but all of them declined this offer due to ambitions of returning to 
Guatemala at some point.23 From December 1945 to January 1946, deliberations as to whether 
Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm could return to Guatemala took place, ultimately affecting the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Liechtenstein citizenship not as an expedient means of being considered a non-German national by Guatemala, but 
in response to his previous experiences with the United States during the First World War, since there would appear 
to have been little anticipation that Guatemala would break its neutrality and align itself with the Allied states 
against the Axis powers at the time when compared to speculation that the United States might pursue this course. 
18 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
19 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
20 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
21 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
22 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
23 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
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outcome that both were permitted to return to Guatemala accounting for their citizenship there.24 
However, Frederich Nottebohm was not permitted to return to Guatemala upon his own release 
from US detention on January 22, 1946, and he therefore made Liechtenstein his place of 
residence.25 Any attempts by Friedrich Nottebohm to resecure his residency in Guatemala were 
only complicated further by the passage of Decree Law No. 689 in Guatemala by 1949, which 
retroactively excluded anyone considered to be an “enemy alien” who had changed their 
citizenship after October 1938 from the benefits of having a legitimate claim to separate 
nationality.26 
 It is where the issue of citizenship is concerned that the pertinence of Friedrich 
Nottebohm’s circumstances to the eponymous case that inspired such international controversy 
becomes apparent. Insinuations that Friedrich Nottebohm changed his citizenship merely for 
practical reasons, but did not effectively abandon any ties to his native Germany, are rife 
throughout the relevant documents concerning the Nottebohm Case. Therefore, the actual 
relevancy of Nottebohm’s change of citizenship became a focal point of fervid questioning. For 
example, the submission on the part of the government of Guatemala alleges that “Mr. 
Nottebohm appears to have solicited Liechtenstein nationality fraudulently, that is to say, with 
the sole object of acquiring the status of a neutral national before returning to Guatemala, and 
without any genuine intention to establish a durable link, excluding German nationality, between 
                                                          
24 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare.": In December 1945, Karl-Heinz Nottebohm was released by the United States 
and permitted to return to Guatemala. The government of Guatemala also requested the release of Kurt Nottebohm, 
which US District Court Judge Vogel acquiesced to on January 10, 1946 by ordering the release of Kurt, after which 
time Kurt was promptly charged with having an unlawful presence in the United States and was given ninety days to 
return to Guatemala. 
25 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare.": When released, Friedrich travelled to New Orleans to apply for permission to 
return to Guatemala, but his readmission was refused by Guatemalan authorities. When Friedrich appealed the 
Guatemalan Foreign Ministry’s decision to cancel his registration as a citizen of Liechtenstein, his attempts were 
unsuccessful, and he was consigned to living in Liechtenstein given his citizenship there. 
26 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare.": The Guatemalan government took the official position that it was entitled to 
expropriate Frederich Nottebohm’s property in Guatemala without compensation since he was an enemy alien. 
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the Principality and himself.”27 Perhaps more surprisingly, the ICJ’s own articulation of the final 
outcome of the proceedings more bluntly asserts that “naturalization was asked for not so much 
for the purpose of obtaining a legal recognition of Nottebohm's membership in fact in the 
population of Liechtenstein, as it was to enable him to substitute for his status as a national of a 
belligerent State that of a national of a neutral State, with the sole aim of thus coming within the 
protection of Liechtenstein but not of becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of 
life or of assuming the obligations—other than fiscal obligations—and exercising the rights 
pertaining to the status thus acquired.”28 While the ICJ technically determined that the case 
should be dismissed, this outcome aligned with Guatemala’s national position regarding 
Nottebohm’s intrinsic identity as a German national, as made evident by the above statements. 
 If the International Court of Justice implicitly acknowledged the validity of Guatemala’s 
position that Nottebohm’s deportation to United States custody was legitimate due to his 
recognition as a German national, to what can one attribute Guatemala’s continued justification 
of their actions in detaining and rendering Nottebohm abroad on the pretext that he maintained a 
German identity? It is notable that his nephews, Kurt and Karl-Heinz, were permitted to return to 
Guatemala after the war, whereas Friedrich remained in exile from his historic country of 
residence. One might initially hypothesize that these circumstances were accounted for by some 
divergence in their respective status as perceived security concerns outside of custody.  
However, this notion is dispelled by the evidence, which raises a myriad of complications. For 
instance, a November 1945 dispatch identifies Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm as being 
considered among the five most important internees from Guatemala representing ostensive Axis 
interests therein by the United States embassy in Guatemala, before seemingly contradictorily 
                                                          
27 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 11. 
28 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 26: The International Court of Justice submitted their decision by a 
count of eleven votes to three, declaring the claim submitted by the government of Liechtenstein to be inadmissible.  
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proceeding with the statement that “there is no evidence to show that [Kurt and Karl-Heinz 
Nottebohm] were Nazi Party members or that they collaborated with the Nazi Party and its 
inimical activities. In some instances, evidence has been produced to show that the persons 
concerned were at least personally or passively anti-Nazi.”29 Even earlier in 1944, a civil enemy 
alien hearing board in the United States determined that Karl-Heinz posed no wartime security 
threat.30 However, the case of their uncle Friedrich provides little contrast with the evidence 
regarding Kurt and Karl-Heinz on this basis, since a subsequent memorandum from the United 
States embassy in Guatemala in December 1945 contained information that “Nottebohm’s name 
does not appear on the Nazi party list believed to be authentic, and there is no reliable evidence 
to indicate that he was a member of the party or even a sympathizer of Hitler.”31 In addition to 
this report, authorities of the United States government expressed “grave doubt” regarding the 
credibility of a letter allegedly containing Friedrich Nottebohm’s assertions that he would “fight 
for the greatness of Germany and its cause,” which was speculated to corroborate Guatemalan 
claims against Friedrich to justify the legal confiscation of his properties in Guatemala.32 
Therefore, it would seem untoward to suggest that the cases of Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm 
on the one hand, and Friedrich Nottebohm on the other, were divergent in their status as 
perceived security threats. Rather, the collective evidence would suggest that none of the 
Nottebohms interned as part of the renditions were even considered to be serious hemispheric 
security threats during and even preceding the time of their release. 
                                                          
29 Max Paul Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign Against The Germans of Latin 
America in World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 167: The embassy statements additionally 
and frankly emphasize the weakness of the cases outlined against the Nottebohms, alongside their general manager, 
Martin Knoetzsch, who was also interned as part of the Good Neighbor renditions. 
30 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
31 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
32 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
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However, this in turn raises another question as to why the Nottebohms even continued to 
be held under internment in the custody of the United States when none were actually considered 
legitimate security threats at their release, and in the case of Karl-Heinz, even for a significant 
duration of his detention in the United States. On this count, the determination of the civil enemy 
alien hearing board regarding Karl-Heinz Nottebohm is telling in its assessment: “It appears that 
the only reason for keeping [Karl-Heinz] in internment is the contention of the U.S. Embassy in 
Guatemala and the U.S. State Department that his release would be detrimental to the economic 
policy of the United States in Central America.”33 The economic motivation depicted in the 
hearing board’s determination also corresponds to the later 1945 embassy dispatch, which states 
that the “five most important internees [including Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm represent] 
major Axis commercial and/or agricultural interests in this country.”34 As has already been 
noted, this same embassy dispatch explicitly outlined the implausibility of the Nottebohms’ 
supposed ties to the Third Reich, but barring the flagrant contradiction embodied by the 
dispatch’s varied contents on the affiliations of the five mentioned internees, the commonality of 
economic motivations recurs in the dispatch, as with the hearing board’s determination in 1944. 
 While these statements solely concern the nephews Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm as 
opposed to their uncle, one will recall that Friedrich Nottebohm was an important co-founder of 
the commerce and banking firm Nottebohm Hermanos, its coffee-producing subsidiary 
Compañia de Plantaciones “Cecilia” Limitada, and other enterprises. Even prior to the onset of 
the United States’ involvement in the Second World War, the United Kingdom added Nottebohm 
Hermanos to a roster of blacklisted companies on November 1, 1939, and the United States 
would later follow suit on July 17, 1941 by adding three Nottebohm-affiliated companies to a 
                                                          
33 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
34 Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors,167. 
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“Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals,” accompanying a wave of bad publicity 
surrounding Nottebohm’s holdings in Central America.35 By December 3, 1941, four days in 
advance of the Pearl Harbor attacks and the subsequent formal United States entry into the 
Second World War, Nottebohm Banking Co. and its subsidiaries had been forced into closure 
due to their position on the blacklist.36 By 1942, the United States had also financially blacklisted 
Frederich, Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm themselves, alongside several other businesses 
affiliated therewith.37 
Thusly, the totality of the evidence appears to vindicate the notion that the United States’ 
chief motivation for their activities against residents of Japanese, German and Italian ancestry in 
Latin America and their holdings, as with the Nottebohms in Guatemala, was economic in 
nature. Even preceding their involvement in the Second World War, the United States appeared 
to act in accordance with a notion of economic realpolitik that was not conducive with a spirit of 
equalized competition, wherein perceived foreign investments were targeted. Though the United 
States may not have largely been aware of the implausibility of the notion that the Nottebohms 
were acting in alignment with the Axis cause until 1944 at latest, the presented evidence would 
nevertheless suggest that the United States’ targeting of the Nottebohms, and by extension other 
alleged Axis affiliates and their holdings in Latin America, was conducted on the basis of 
diminishing their economic activities in the Western Hemisphere. This idea is in contrast to such 
hypotheses as advanced by proponents such as David R. Mowry that allege that the policy lead-
up to the Good Neighbor renditions was affected predominately due to concerns of subversion 
                                                          
35 Special Cable to The New York Times, "Questions Nazi Purchase: Salvadorean Press Comments on Acquiring of 
Large Estate," New York Times, May 11, 1941; Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare" 
36 "German Company in Guatemala Closes," Los Angeles Times, December 4, 1941. 
37 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare.": In 1942, the US government added Friederich and his nephews, Karl-Heinz and 
Kurt Nottebohm, to the US blacklist, alongside more family businesses, including the Nottebohm Banking 
Corporation. Much of the Nottebohms’ collective property located in the United States was later deemed to be 
vested in the US government, signifying that it could be held, used, administered, liquidated or sold by the United 
States in any manner that the US desired. 
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following from the precedent of the First World War.38 Alongside both the wartime and post-war 
textual evidence to this effect, economic motivations are reflected by the fact that the United 
States blacklisted the Nottebohms and their various enterprises well in advance of its own entry 
into the Second World War, complicating the idea that security concerns were a principal 
concern to the degree that inhibiting economic competition by foreign powers was. Additionally, 
the United States may have conducted the blacklist procedure on the Nottebohms and others as a 
gesture of open solidarity with the United Kingdom, thereby helping to consolidate the emerging 
“special relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom that would grow in 
proportion following the United States’ entry into the war.39 Lastly and less ambiguously, the 
United States also apparently sought to benefit from the release of United States prisoners held 
by the Axis powers through prisoner exchanges and “repatriations”, though the consensual 
nature of this process exemplified by the Nottebohms’ mutual ability to opt out of a 
“repatriation” to Germany suggest that this was also merely a periphery goal. 
While this information has added to discerning the role that the United States played in 
shaping the Good Neighbor renditions, and specifically the case against the Nottebohms, as 
concerns the influence of economic motivations, the cultivation of geopolitical alliances and the 
potential for prisoner exchanges vis-á-vis countering the threat of subversion, it does not answer 
the earlier query as to why Guatemala was inclined to readmit Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm, 
but not their uncle Friedrich. Moreover, by extension, it does not directly address Guatemala’s 
motivations for participating in the Good Neighbor renditions. However, what this information 
                                                          
38 David P. Mowry, German Clandestine Activities in South America in World War II (Ft. Meade, MD: Office of 
Archives and History of the National Security Agency and Central Security Service, 1989), v: David Mowry 
presents a thorough account of German intelligence organizations engaged in clandestine work in South America 
and reports on the US response to the perceived threat. This perception on the part of the United States was far 
greater than any actual danger, according to Mowry. 
39 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare." 
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has yielded is critical context for assessing whether Guatemalan objectives strictly aligned with 
United States objectives in manifesting the Good Neighbor renditions, which might suggest an 
unequal or coercive partnership with the United States as a dominant force, or whether 
Guatemala pursued the Good Neighbor renditions to achieve their own unique ends, even though 
these ends would likely still be complementary to United States interests. As the succeeding 
information will demonstrate, the latter notion that Guatemala pursued the Good Neighbor 
renditions for purposes that complemented, but did not always directly align with, United States 
interests is more plausible. 
While I have contended that the United States government was principally motivated by a 
desire to reduce economic competition from perceived (Axis) foreigners, as well as to shore up 
alliance support with nation-states such as the United Kingdom and to supply internees for 
potential prisoner exchanges with the Axis powers, Guatemala’s motivations for both 
participating in the Good Neighbor renditions and their specific attempts to exclude Friedrich 
Nottebohm from his previous place of residence appear to be rooted in other factors 
notwithstanding the United States’ goals and desires. This distinction between Guatemalan and 
United States motivations is highlighted by the separate treatment of Kurt and Karl-Heinz as 
opposed to their uncle Friedrich. When Karl-Heinz Nottebohm was promptly released from 
United States custody in December 1945 and permitted to return to Guatemala, contrary to the 
recommendations of the United States embassy in Guatemala, the government of Guatemala also 
petitioned for the release of Kurt Nottebohm, and his release was granted on January 10, 1946 by 
order of a United States district court.40 Conversely, following Friedrich Nottebohm’s release 
from United States custody on January 22, 1946, Friedrich attempted to apply for permission to 
reobtain his residency in Guatemala, but was turned down several times by Guatemalan 
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authorities, and the passage of Decree Law No. 689 in 1949 only consolidated Friedrich’s 
inability to return to Guatemala as a resident.41 These divergent approaches by the Guatemalan 
government suggested that the Guatemalans successfully expressed their own diplomatic 
requests and expectations to the United States even when these did not correspond to the United 
States’ activities (i.e. by securing Kurt Nottebohm’s release from United States custody), and 
that their objectives did not always actively align with United States actions (i.e. since they 
refused to readmit Friedrich Nottebohm to Guatemala upon his release by United States 
authorities). 
It is also worth noting that United States authorities suspected direct Guatemalan 
involvement in attempting to erroneously portray Friedrich Nottebohm as a potential German co-
belligerent at an earlier juncture. This was due to United States suspicions that the Guatemalans 
were attempting to expropriate Friedrich Nottebohm’s property using the dubious letter advanced 
as evidence for his Axis sympathies.42 Though Kurt and Karl-Heinz Nottebohm were not 
subjected to the degree of scrutiny and opprobrium that their uncle was during and following the 
Good Neighbor renditions, it is also worth recalling that while Kurt and Karl-Heinz were born in 
Guatemala and ultimately acquired the right of jus soli citizenship, their uncle Friedrich was born 
abroad in Hamburg, Germany long preceding his arrival in Guatemala and never attempted to 
secure citizenship in Guatemala to complement his residency there. This distinction was likely 
critical to the manner in which the nephews and the uncle were respectively treated by the 
Guatemalan government. This conclusion is borne out by the fact that the Nottebohm family 
residing in Guatemala only had sixteen of their plantation estates returned to them in 1962 
following the death of Friedrich Nottebohm, in a reversal of many of the preceding 
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expropriations that dispossessed ethnic Germans of their assets and properties using a wartime 
pretext; these expropriations had later been exploited under General Carlos Castillo Armas in 
1956 to justify the nationalization of these seized wartime properties following the determination 
in the Nottebohm Case.43 
What this evidence would suggest is that Guatemala pursued the Good Neighbor 
renditions in part due to their benefits in facilitating land reform and property/asset seizures, 
which helped to accrue financial benefits to the Guatemalan state. This proto-Dependencia 
understanding of Guatemalan conditions may have eschewed affording rights to perceived 
foreigners such as Friedrich Nottebohm to have massive financial and property holdings in 
Guatemala, while acknowledging the rights of native-born Guatemalans such as Kurt and Karl-
Heinz to maintain their properties in Guatemala.44 This was quite likely premised on the notion 
that native-born Guatemalans were more likely to have more investment in the Guatemalan 
economy, as opposed to foreigners such as Friedrich who might distribute their holdings abroad 
as well (such as in Liechtenstein), which would also help to account for the Guatemalan 
government’s decision to return property to those Nottebohm citizens residing in Guatemala 
upon the death of Friedrich.  
                                                          
43 Buys, "Nottebohm’s Nightmare.": Following the ICJ’s decision, the Guatemalan Congress voted on November 23, 
1956 to expropriate all German property without compensation, prompting a diplomatic spat between Guatemala 
and West Germany that resulted in West Germany’s refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Guatemala. The 
Guatemalan government determined that virtually all German property confiscated during World War II would be 
registered permanently as state property to pay for Guatemala’s “war damages.” In consequence, Friedrich 
Nottebohm was stripped of all of his Guatemalan properties and received no compensation for his loss, cf. Friedman, 
Nazis and Good Neighbors, 187. 
44 Raymond D. Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Toward Precision of Concept and Argument" 
in International Organization 32 (1978): Dependencia, or dependency theory, posits an asymmetric relationship 
between a core composed of developed, and predominately Western, states (in the form of a “Global North”) and a 
periphery composed of developing, and predominately non-Western, states (in the form of a “Global South”). 
Dependency theory grew especially prevalent in Latin America, where proponents used it as an analytical 
framework to justify concentrating industries in the domestic economy rather than relying on foreign imports from 
more developed economies. In this sense, Guatemala may have favored those with jus soli citizenship, who tended 
to be more integrated into the domestic economy (as with the native-born Kurt and Karl-Heinz), rather than foreign 
residents that maintained ties to outside economies (such as Friedrich, who had historic financial ties to countries 
such as Liechtenstein, Germany and the United States). 
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 In summary, the presented evidence would suggest that it is reasonable to conclude that 
the divergent responses to and treatment of Friedrich Nottebohm and his nephews by the 
respective countries of the United States and Guatemala imply that the United States and 
Guatemala pursued the Good Neighbor renditions for different though complementary reasons in 
the case of the Nottebohms. The evidence from this case-study of the Nottebohms would suggest 
that while the United States participated in the Good Neighbor renditions to affect the reduction 
of hemispheric economic competition, to geopolitically reach out to other states and to 
accumulate internees for prisoner exchanges with the Axis powers, Guatemala did so specifically 
to achieve nationalist advancement through facilitating land reform, property seizures and asset 
expropriation, as a means of accruing exclusive benefits to the Guatemalan economy. While the 
attention lavished on the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) makes it a useful 
exemplar of the diplomatic contents that undergirded the Good Neighbor renditions and the 
effects that these diplomatic arrangements had down to the individual level, it is useful to 
ascertain whether the evidence of mutually beneficial reasons for engaging in the Good Neighbor 
renditions on the part of the United States and Latin American countries are borne out by other 
cases. 
 
Chapter Two: Diplomats and Policymakers 
While the Nottebohm Case illustrates the manner in which United States and Latin 
American motivations for participation in the Good Neighbor renditions highlight a mutualistic 
culture of diplomatic respect within the context of the Good Neighbor Policy era, other evidence 
also lends credence to the idea that the Good Neighbor renditions were manifested as the mutual 
product of United States and Latin American objectives, rather than merely representing a 
hallmark of United States dominance over the region. In particular, evidence of this 
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characterization is prevalent in various United States foreign relations documents, alongside 
other corresponding and accompanying pieces of evidence. Taken together, this evidence 
reaffirms the conclusion that Latin America’s interests did not tend to be subordinate to those of 
the United States, but rather tended to complement United States objectives in the context of the 
Good Neighbor Policy. Indeed, an examination of the totality of the evidence leads one to 
surmise that Latin America played a critical role in shaping the manifestation of the Good 
Neighbor renditions in an assortment of cases. 
United States foreign relations documents from as early as 1939 that highlight the 
significance of having a source of prisoners for use in exchanges with wartime opponents 
confirm the importance of prisoner exchanges as a distinct United States policy objective that 
would carry over into the later Good Neighbor renditions. Under the heading of “The 
Repatriation of Americans and Others from Belligerent Countries,” a telegram by Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull to the United States ambassador in France from September 29, 1939 reads  
while there is still time and before [the practice of interning civilian enemy aliens en 
 masse] comes into being, this Government earnestly hopes that the belligerent 
 governments will give thought to means of avoiding this harshness to civilians, perhaps 
 by mutual release for repatriation through neutral countries of adult males under parole 
 not to bear arms, such paroles to be reported to the enemy government or governments 
 through the Powers representing their interests in enemy countries.45 
 
Ironically, this proposition foreshadowed the prisoner exchange aspect of the Good Neighbor 
renditions by providing an early template for the “mutual release for repatriation through neutral 
countries” of interned civilians. At first glance, this might lead one to conclude that the United 
States was more instrumental in shaping the dimensions of the Good Neighbor renditions than 
Latin American states were, since it had seemingly already formulated a method for the conduct 
                                                          
45 United States Department of State, General, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, vol. I. (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 642: In the telegram, Hull also acknowledges that civilian internees 
who are considered to be enemy aliens should be treated according to the same principles that prisoners of war are in 
accordance with the Convention of Geneva of 1929. 
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of prisoner exchanges. However, Hull’s emphasis on avoiding the practice of placing civilian 
enemy aliens under internment from the outset, and thereby foregoing the detention of enemy 
aliens, highlights United States opposition to the practice of effectively taking civilians as 
“hostages” to be traded, quite unlike what occurred during the Good Neighbor renditions.46 
 To what motivations can one then attribute the decision to render civilians of Japanese, 
German and Italian descent from various Latin American countries to the custody of the United 
States? It is worth noting that several Latin American countries maintained their own internment 
programs in cooperation with the United States, rather than deporting their citizens to the 
custody of the United States as part of the renditions. While twelve Latin American countries 
documentably participated in the Good Neighbor renditions, the states of Argentina, Brazil, 
Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela purportedly either maintained their own independent 
internment programs or did not collaborate with the United States at all.47 Given that these 
countries maintained the integrity of independence in how to conduct their own affairs and 
manage their own residents, one may be inclined to speculate that those countries that did 
participate in the renditions acquiesced to the application of United States pressure. However, on 
the basis of the evidence, it would seem that those countries that would end up participating in 
the Good Neighbor renditions not only tended to do so willingly, but actively molded and used 
the renditions as an opportunity to facilitate their own objectives. 
                                                          
46 United States Department of State, General, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, vol. I. (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 642. 
47 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, vol. IX 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 297, cf. Selfa A. Chew, Uprooting Community: 
Japanese Mexicans, World War II, and the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 
2015), 152-184: The Mexican-American borderlands scholar Selfa Chew has recently asserted that the case of a 
Japanese-Mexican family detained at the Crystal City internment camp in Texas complicates the pre-standing 
viewpoint that Mexico was not a participant in the Good Neighbor renditions, but had solely maintained its own 
domestic internment program in cooperation with the United States. 
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 Indeed, one key section of an airgram dated from June 21, 1943 that is also attributed to 
the Secretary of State Cordell Hull implies that even the prisoner exchanges associated with the 
Good Neighbor renditions were enacted partly to support Latin American priorities tied to their 
participation in support of United States endeavors.48 In the relevant section, Hull states that it 
was  
the [State] Department’s intention to obtain the release of the various officials of the 
 American Republics who are held by the enemy in Europe and to discharge certain 
 obligations to certain of the other American Republics to repatriate enemy nationals 
 deported from those Republics for repatriation prior to the collapse of the exchange. The 
 Department’s proposal was drawn up in a manner to permit any collateral negotiations by 
 other of the American Republics within the general framework of its proposal which 
 would satisfy their requirements without reopening the question of a general exchange.49 
 
That Hull makes reference to a “satisfaction of requirements” necessary to secure Latin 
American support for the objectives of the United States associated with the prisoner exchange 
aspect of the Good Neighbor renditions is quite telling in and of itself. It suggests a culture of 
mutualistic diplomacy between the United States and participating Latin American states that is 
relatively devoid of the Thucydidean dynamic often held to be characteristic of relations between 
the United States and Latin America.50 However, Hull’s elaboration that the “repatriations” of 
“enemy nationals” deported from participating Latin American states was enacted partly to 
secure the reciprocal repatriation of Latin American officials being held captive by the Axis 
powers is even more intriguing. This evidence would suggest that the United States was not 
                                                          
48 G.R. Berridge and Lorna Lloyd, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy, Third Edition (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 11: According to the Dictionary of Diplomacy, an airgram is defined as a formal 
diplomatic communication sent in the diplomatic pouch [i.e. a container in which official mail is sent to or from an 
embassy without being subject to customs inspection] by air when a cable was considered too laborious (if encoding 
was needed) or too expensive (due to its length). 
49 United States Department of State, General, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. I. (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 96. 
50 In Thucydides’ account of the “Melian Dialogue” between the Athenians and the neutral Melians during the 
Peloponnesian War that took place between Athenian- and Spartan-aligned forces, he imparts the classic phrase that 
“the strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must” in accordance with the dictates of realpolitik, 
which is apparently quite contrary to the spirit of the diplomatic arrangements between the more powerful United 
States and Latin American countries that appears to be indicated by Hull’s airgram. 
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uniquely devoted to utilizing those Latin American residents detained as part of the Good 
Neighbor renditions for the purpose of facilitating its own prisoner exchanges, but was similarly 
obligated to assist Latin American countries in re-securing their desired nationals from Axis 
custody using the deported residents for the exchanges. 
 The implications of Cordell Hull’s airgram of 1943 are quite potent for contemplating the 
possibility that the Good Neighbor renditions evince evidence that the Good Neighbor Policy 
secured coequal diplomatic outcomes between the United States and the Latin American 
countries rhetorically embraced as part of the outreach associated with the policy. This is not 
least because these implications suggest that a key motivation traditionally attributed to the 
United States for enacting the prisoner exchanges may have also been the product of Latin 
American ambitions to mutually secure the release of their own officials, which complicates 
ideas that the prisoner exchanges were exclusively affected by the United States. Additional 
evidence corroborates the assertion that the United States was not necessarily essential to 
manifesting the prisoner exchanges associated with the Good Neighbor renditions. For instance, 
the head of the Special War Problems Division and Assistant Secretary of State, Breckenridge 
Long, noted that Latin American states “sent [the United States] Axis nationals only on the basis 
of our solemn promise to repatriate them [to Axis states].”51 When tensions over the repatriation 
of the deported internees arose between the United States and Latin America, it is clear that Latin 
American states were able to leverage their cooperation with United States objectives as part of 
the Good Neighbor Program to their advantage. This was observed by another official of the 
Special War Problems Division, Albert Clattenburg, who expressed concerns that a breakdown 
in the prisoner exchanges could threaten Latin American cooperation with United States security 
                                                          
51 Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors, 196-197. 
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measures.52 When faced with protestations on the part of countries such as Ecuador, Guatemala 
and Peru that the United States was not honoring its commitment to repatriate internees to the 
Axis states within due course, Breckinridge Long accordingly advised that the United States 
should send the internees to the Axis states as soon as possible, since the internees were “much 
less dangerous to [the United States] in Germany than they are south of the Rio Grande.”53 
 What the assorted evidence therefore suggests is that Latin Americans not only helped to 
shape the trajectory of the prisoner exchanges with the Axis powers, but that they were arguably 
the principal contributors to the prisoner exchange dimension of the Good Neighbor renditions. 
Recalling that the case of the Nottebohm family appeared to correspond to an overall United 
States respect for the desires of internees regarding voluntary repatriation, it would appear that 
Latin American states had a more vested stake in pursuing the prisoner exchanges than even the 
United States did. Thusly, rather than largely acting in acquiescence to the desires of the United 
States as other sources suggest, Latin American states actually actively sought to ensure that 
repatriations were affected as part of the Good Neighbor renditions.54 That Latin America took 
such a proactive role in shaping the contours of the prisoner exchanges contrary to notions that 
the United States was most prominently responsible for advocating prisoner exchange 
encourages scholars to investigate the other ways in which Latin Americans were equally, if not 
more, influential in manifesting several of the policies associated with the Good Neighbor 
                                                          
52 Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors, 197. 
53 Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors, 196-197. 
54 Clinton Harvey Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian Japanese and the United States (Seattle, 
WA: University of Washington Press, 1981), 56-57: Gardiner makes note of interdepartmental furor between the 
State Department and the Justice Department in the United States regarding the desirability and legality of 
“repatriating” prior Latin American residents to the Axis states, including Breckenridge Long’s alignment with the 
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situation he was confronted with was “like a pitchfork with me on the sharp end,” accounting for the contrasting 
pressures created in part by the persistence of Latin American states in demanding repatriation, see Friedman, Nazis 
and Good Neighbors, 197. 
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renditions. Significant to addressing these understandings is achieving a fuller understanding of 
what assorted Latin American countries sought to gain from their role in the Good Neighbor 
renditions. 
 Once more, evidence is readily acquired from United States foreign relations documents, 
from which one can infer a great deal about Latin America’s unique role in helping to mold the 
specific form taken by the Good Neighbor renditions. In particular, several diplomatic 
communications make allusion to the role played by Latin American states in exploiting the 
Good Neighbor renditions to suit their own domestic policy objectives, and prominent among 
these objectives is land reform and expropriation of the holdings of those interned as part of the 
renditions.  In the case of Guatemala, this is highlighted by several communications between the 
Chargé in Guatemala, Gerald A. Drew, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull in early 1943, within 
which Drew makes reference to domestic Guatemalan efforts to seize properties and holdings of 
internees without compensating their owners, and thereby attempting to affect nationalization of 
these properties and holdings; from Drew’s assessments, one gathers that Guatemalan aims do 
not conflict with United States objectives.55 However, in a separate communication from the 
United States ambassador in Guatemala, Fay Allen Des Portes, to Secretary of State Hull on 
April 20, 1943, Des Portes makes note of the fact that “[President Jorge Ubico] stated that the 
Guatemalan government could not constitutionally proceed to expropriation of Proclaimed List 
properties at the present time but at the Peace Conference his Government would present to the 
Axis Powers a bill for claims arising from the War which would be in excess of the value of the 
                                                          
55 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 
VI. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 346-355: In particular, Gerald A. Drew devotes 
much of the discussion to the matter of retaining extant levels of Guatemalan coffee exports to the United States 
under new management. 
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Proclaimed List properties.”56 Des Portes’ dissatisfaction with Ubico’s proposal is evident in his 
succeeding remarks, wherein he notes Ubico’s divergence from the previous assertion that the 
Guatemalan government would promptly proceed with expropriation, and declares that he finds 
Guatemala’s change in attitude to be inscrutable at the time of writing.57 What one can gather 
from Des Portes’ exchange with Hull is that the internal domestic processes of the Guatemalan 
government were not wholly subordinated to cooptation by United States interests, and that the 
Guatemalan government exercised much of its own initiative in affecting outcomes as part of the 
processes associated with the Good Neighbor renditions, including expropriation and land 
reform. 
 Similar evidence is found in communications between the ambassador in Nicaragua, 
James B. Stewart, and the Secretary of State on August 31, 1943, wherein Ambassador Stewart 
discusses the legislative process in Nicaragua with respect to attempts to facilitate the 
expropriation of property and holdings associated with the Good Neighbor renditions.58 The 
theme of internal deliberations within Latin American countries complicating United States 
objectives associated with the confiscation of properties and holdings recurs in this case as well, 
albeit more subtly than in the example of Ambassador Des Portes’ characterizations of the 
situation in Guatemala. While Stewart reports that Dr. Leopoldo Arguello Gil, an attorney for the 
Ministry of Hacienda, had consulted the Minister of Hacienda and one of his staff members, and 
advocated conceding to several changes to facilitate the process of expropriation that were 
ultimately consented to within the Nicaraguan government, Stewart nevertheless makes note of 
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VI. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 355-356: President Ubico also stated that the 
responsibility for payment for the expropriated properties demanded by owners would be deferred to the German 
government, which would be forced to compensate the owners for their losses. 
57 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 
VI. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 356. 
58 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 
VI. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 636-639. 
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the fact that the Nicaraguan House Committee did not recede from its recommendation to permit 
hearings for affected parties of the expropriations.59 Stewart also consistently mentions that both 
he and his staff had assiduously maintained a policy of noninterference in these internal 
deliberations of the Nicaraguan government consistent with official State Department policy.60 
Collectively, this evidence contains the implication akin to that present in the case of Guatemala 
that Latin American countries such as Nicaragua possessed the autonomy to extensively 
contribute to the form of the expropriations that were undertaken accompanying the Good 
Neighbor renditions. 
 In some cases, Latin American governments were quite open in their unwillingness to 
assent to the requests of the United States as part of the Good Neighbor renditions. For example, 
this was the case in Costa Rica, wherein the United States embassy took exception to the 
activities of the Spanish minister Angel de la Mora y Arenas in ostensibly refusing to subject 
$141,895.25 worth of Italian government funds in his custody that were being used to bankroll 
the subsistence of Italian residents of Costa Rica to the control of the Junta de Custodia 
therein.61 However, according to Ambassador Fay Allen Des Portes in an airgram from June 1, 
1943: 
 while this Embassy has maintained the position that the Spanish Minister’s views should 
 not be permitted to affect or restrict the Costa Rican Government’s sovereign right to deal 
 with enemy property within its territory, the Costa Rican Government, many of whose 
 officials maintain cordial and friendly personal relations with the Spanish Minister, has 
 tended to accede to his wishes in the matter for the following reasons: 1. The funds in 
 question are deposited in the name of the Spanish Minister only and not in his name as 
 representative of Italian interests here. Thus, technically, it may be interpreted that the 
 funds are either his own, or the property of the Spanish Government. This circumstance 
                                                          
59 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 
VI. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 638. 
60 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 
VI. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 636-639. 
61 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 
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 has been used by the Spanish Minister in order to bolster his bargaining position; 2. The 
 Spanish Minister has indicated that to place “his” funds under the control of the Alien 
 Property Custodian (Junta de Custodia) would stigmatize him as an enemy of Costa Rica 
 and would be interpreted as an unfriendly act toward him and his government; [and] 3. 
 The [Costa Rican] Minister of Foreign Affairs is particularly desirous of maintaining 
 cordial relations with the Spanish Government.62 
 
That Costa Rican officials prioritized their relationship with the neutral, though arguably Axis-
sympathetic, Spanish government and its diplomatic representative in their country over their 
relationship with the United States concerning their role in the Good Neighbor renditions 
highlights the degree to which Latin American acquiescence to the Good Neighbor renditions 
was often conditional. In this regard, Latin America clearly had an important role in affecting the 
form that the Good Neighbor renditions tended to take. 
 It is equally worth noting that even cases exhibiting an ostensive Latin American 
government desire to acquiesce to United States pressures could often be accounted for by an 
accompanying desire to domestically exploit this acquiescence. Such a case is demonstrated by 
the correspondence between the ambassador in El Salvador, Walter Thurston, and the Secretary 
of State on June 26, 1943 regarding Salvadoran attitudes toward conforming to United States 
attempts to affect the freeze of assets and restrict the sale of properties belonging to firms or 
individuals on the Proclaimed List.63 In the communication with Hull, Thurston notes that, in a 
personal query that he directed to President Maximiliano Hernández Martínez regarding the 
adoption of legislation to suit United States objectives of eliminating perceived Axis interests in 
El Salvador, Martínez responded that any such measures were presently considered to be 
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unconstitutional and that the only solution to the problem was to call for a plebiscite to make 
amendments to the constitution.64 Subsequently, Thurston states that 
 it is becoming increasingly obvious (and I was informed of the fact almost by direct 
 assertion a few days ago by Señor Francisco Aguilar, a close associate of the president) 
 that it is the intention to bring about General Martínez’ continuation in office for a fourth 
 term. Inasmuch as the Constitution of 1939 (itself the product of a Constituent Assembly 
 designed to make possible Martínez’s present third term) forbids succession in office, the 
 only means by which this plan can be carried out is by another Constituent Assembly and 
 change of Constitution. It is to be assumed that the President and his advisers would be 
 glad to seize upon our desire to effect the liquidation of enemy alien interests in El 
 Salvador as the pretext for convoking a Constituent Assembly.65 
 
The internal exploitation of the Good Neighbor renditions and associated efforts to expunge 
Latin America of perceived Axis influences extended not only to domestic agendas of land 
reform and expropriation, but likewise to internal attempts by certain factions to retain power 
using these domestic (and foreign) agendas as a proxy.66 
That Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua were all Central American 
countries, and thereby belonged to a region that had historically (and subsequently) been a major 
focal point of United States hegemonic ambitions in line with the Monroe Doctrine, should 
strongly attest to Latin America’s ability to affect those outcomes that it desired within the 
context of the Good Neighbor Policy. What has seemed to be a characteristic dynamic of United 
States domination over Latin America, and not least Central America, is complicated by the 
totality of the evidence of diplomacy during the time of the Good Neighbor renditions. If the 
Central American countries were able to have such an instrumental role in shaping the contours 
                                                          
64 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 
VI. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 325. 
65 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, vol. 
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66 United States Department of State, The American Republics, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, vol. 
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of the Good Neighbor renditions, then one would expect this pattern to recur elsewhere in Latin 
America. 
Outside of Central America, further evidence helps to situate the Good Neighbor 
renditions as the partial product of Latin American influences over their manifestation. Nowhere 
is this likely more evident than in Peru, which deported its Japanese population to United States 
custody, alongside German and Italian residents.67 Indeed, the very composition of those 
internees that were sent abroad to the United States was largely the product of Peruvian 
manipulation. Scholar Clinton Harvey Gardiner notes that Peruvian enthusiasm toward rendering 
proclaimed enemy aliens to United States custody varied by the ethnicity of the people involved, 
with the Peruvian government displaying a far greater inclination to retain Germans (who had 
more often insinuated themselves into the upper strata of Peruvian society) as compared to 
Japanese residents, who tended to be deported with a characteristic abandon.68 That the 
Peruvians could manage to exercise such extensive influence in manifesting the Good Neighbor 
renditions to reflect an outcome that emphasized the preference for deporting certain residents 
over others illustrates the significant role that Peru played as part of the policy. This observation 
raises the question of Peru’s motivations for insisting on maintaining this emphasis in its 
relations with the United States in the context of the Good Neighbor renditions. The most 
obvious answer to such a query is that internal Peruvian dynamics of socioethnic prejudice were 
being projected onto the broader implementation of the Good Neighbor renditions in accordance 
with mutual United States and Peruvian policy objectives, though an additional motivating factor 
is also implied by Peruvian concern over German detention of their officials abroad.  
                                                          
67 Kashima, Personal Justice Denied, 305: While over two-thirds, or 2,300, of the internees deported to United 
States custody by assorted Latin American governments were Japanese residents, over eighty percent of these 
Japanese residents were composed of Japanese-Peruvians. 
68 Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate, 20. 
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Nevertheless, these dynamics are reflected by the mass disenfranchisement of Japanese in 
Peru preceding the onset of the Good Neighbor renditions. In 1937, the passage of Ley 8526 by 
the administration of President Óscar Benavides was a key portent of Peruvian policies that 
would ensue during the Good Neighbor renditions, as it “restricted the rights of Peruvian citizens 
if they were born to foreign parents by 1) annulling the registration of their birth if it was issued 
via a court order after June 26, 1936 (the date of DS 1936) and 2) indefinitely suspending their 
right to register with judicial authorities if they were born before June 26, 1936.”69 Ley 8526 is a 
prominent exemplar of the discrimination that many Japanese residents came to be confronted 
with in Peru, which reached its peak during the Good Neighbor renditions. The starkness of the 
statistic that over eighty percent of those Japanese residents of Latin America interned under 
United States custody were sourced from Peru is a testament to intense Peruvian influence 
wielded within the context of its wartime diplomatic relations with the United States. While the 
United States in part sought to restrict the activities of any number of perceived Axis-affiliated 
residents of Peru, whether Japanese, German or Italian, the disproportionate amount of Japanese 
that got caught up in the Good Neighbor renditions is a sign that the Peruvians exercised 
extensive influence over the form of the renditions, in line with their own domestic policy 
interests. Peruvian prejudices were more instrumental to informing the character of the renditions 
than United States pressures. 
 Other countries in South America also display attributes of independence in mediating 
the form that the Good Neighbor renditions took, despite their acquiescence to many United 
States requests. In one airgram from February 23, 1944, Ambassador Wesley Frost 
                                                          
69 Stephanie Carol Moore. "The Japanese in Multiracial Peru, 1899-1942." (PhD diss., University of California at 
San Diego, 2009), 268-269: This meant that around 2500 Japanese-Peruvians born in Peru were dispossessed of 
Peruvian citizenship in violation of Article 4 of the Peruvian constitution, which conveyed jus soli citizenship to 
anyone born in Peru. 
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communicated to Secretary of State Cordell Hull that, while Paraguay had increased its control 
over enemy aliens, Italian subjects were exempted from classification as “enemy aliens,” unlike 
the Germans, to whom the designation was more frequently applied.70 The fact that Paraguayans 
shared the Peruvian preference for favoring a certain ethnic subgroup over another, and 
expressed an inclination to focus greater energies on the arbitrary detention (and often 
subsequent rendition) of the other subgroup, implies that the Paraguayans possessed a similar 
spirit of autonomy in their ability to affect the outcomes they desired as part of the Good 
Neighbor renditions. Whether the Paraguayans were as motivated by overt ethnic prejudices in 
their divergent treatment of Italian and German residents seems uncertain on the basis of the 
evidence, but it is clear that Paraguayans also projected internal sociopolitical dynamics onto the 
international context of the Good Neighbor renditions. This evidence mutually suggests that the 
relations of Latin American governments such as that of Paraguay, and the United States, were 
interdependent in formulating the content of the Good Neighbor renditions. 
 In a similar vein, the case of Colombia also demonstrates that the United States found it 
either more prudent or more necessary to default to persuasion rather than pressure in motivating 
Latin American governments to accede to United States desires in the course of the Good 
Neighbor renditions. While a policy evaluation of Colombia from 1950 makes note of the fact 
that Colombia “was cooperative in the repatriation and detention of enemy aliens,” earlier 
accounts suggest that this had less to do with acquiescence to United States diplomatic pressure 
than it had to do with responding to other forms of the United States’ incentives.71 In a telegram 
from March 15, 1944, Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane stated that the Chief of Staff of the 
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Colombian Army, General Domingo Espinel, had wrote him a letter requesting four Douglas 
transport planes under Lend-Lease, and that the request was also in the process of being 
delivered by the Colombian embassy in the United States. In response, Lane replied that he 
“would be glad to endorse the request as both Colonel Densford and Colonel Weeks are 
convinced of the need of these planes but that I felt certain the Colombian Government would 
have a greater chance to obtain this equipment if favorable action were taken with respect to 
enemy aliens.”72 Ultimately, this persuasion motivated the Colombians to subsequently intern 
150 German residents.73 While one might initially perceive this outcome to purely be the product 
of Colombian acquiescence to United States soft power, it seems more reasonable to frame it as 
the product of a mutualistic culture of exchange, wherein Colombians incentivized the United 
States to help themselves obtain lend-lease aid, whereas the United States incentivized Colombia 
to participate more fully in the Good Neighbor renditions. In this manner, the Colombians 
exploited the Good Neighbor renditions to affect a desired policy goal as well. 
 Especially revelatory of the dynamic between the United States and Latin American 
countries participating in the Good Neighbor renditions is a correspondence within the State 
Department accompanying a memorandum from December 26, 1945. The contents of the letter, 
sent by the Acting Secretary of State E.O. Briggs to the Ambassador in Ecuador, Robert M. 
Scotten, are highly demonstrative of a Latin American ability to exercise pressure over the Good 
Neighbor renditions, and read as follows: 
 For your information, the three Governments which made the requests referred to in the 
 memorandum were Peru, Ecuador, and El Salvador. The [State] Department was advised 
 that our position in the matter was creating so much ill will for the United States, 
 particularly in Peru, as seriously to jeopardize the Good Neighbor Policy and that further 
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 argument would be fruitless. Since the United States Government could not legally effect 
 deportations without the consent of these countries (and was in addition committed not to 
 do so), it seemed that the only course open was to accede to the wishes of Peru, Ecuador 
 and El Salvador. Since that was to be done, it was clear that the same opportunity would 
 have to be offered to the other [Latin American] Governments concerned. They would in 
 any event shortly find out about our action toward the three and would demand similar 
 treatment, and it seemed far preferable to be frank with them from the start. While the 
 Department regrets that Peru, Ecuador and El Salvador have seen fit to insist on the 
 return of the aliens they had deported, acceding to their wishes does not represent an 
 abandonment of the repatriation program.74 
 
That the mutually expressed positions of three Latin American countries could foment a return of 
desired internees from their deportation to the United States, not least when these countries have 
a legacy of acquiescing to United States dominance in different contexts, illustrates the profound 
degree to which Latin Americans were able to influence the Good Neighbor renditions to suit 
their ends. Such a policy reversal on the part of the United States is demonstrably indicative of 
the mutualistic nature of the Good Neighbor Policy, and the renditions that accompanied it, as a 
major component of the diplomatic relations between the United States and various Latin 
American countries. Given how wide-ranging and open-ended the dictates contained in the 
correspondence are, this evidence highlights the intense degree to which even limited Latin 
American resistance to United States desires could affect broader changes in United States policy 
toward Latin America. 
It is additionally worth recalling that several Latin American countries elected not to 
participate in the Good Neighbor renditions at all, often in favor of maintaining their own 
domestic internment programs. Among such states were countries including Venezuela, 
Uruguay, Cuba, and allegedly Mexico.75 Some states such as Chile and Argentina did not even 
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maintain their own internment programs at any point during the period contemporary to the 
Good Neighbor renditions, despite respectively supporting the Allied war effort from 1943 and 
1945 onward.76 Meanwhile, while Brazil was an even more active participant in the Allied war 
effort than many of the other Latin American states aligned with the United States, it also did not 
opt to have a domestic internment program, despite engaging in efforts to monitor and resettle 
members of its extensive, and therefore nearly inextricable, Japanese community.77 While the 
ability of Brazil, Chile and Argentina to remain aloof of United States pressure even accounting 
for the exigencies of wartime diplomacy is understandable, given their overall power relative to 
many of the other Latin American states vis-á-vis the United States, it still highlights a broader 
dynamic at play throughout Latin America in the time of the Good Neighbor Policy. That 
countries such as Cuba could also manage to retain a degree of independence in how they 
managed residents that were potentially perceived to be enemy aliens attests to a broader 
phenomenon that was not merely confined to the more powerful Latin American states.78 Even 
though anomalies such as the internment of Japanese-Mexican Denkei Gushiken and his family 
at the Crystal City Internment Camp in the United States may have been present, the fact that 
such occurrences are considered to be anomalous, if even exceptionally rare, in the Mexican case 
is also a testament to the independence of Latin American countries such as Mexico in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Spruille Braden relates to Secretary of States James F. Byrnes that “Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay and 
Venezuela did not deport enemy aliens for internment in the United States,” cf. Chew, Uprooting Community, 152-
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persuade the Cuban government to intern German, Italian and Japanese prisoners at a prison facility on the Isle of 
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determining the contours of their involvement in wartime efforts associated with the Good 
Neighbor Policy. 
The ability of various Latin American countries in all regions to exercise control over 
their role in and engagement with the Good Neighbor renditions is telling inasmuch as it is 
highly reflective of the broader dynamic of the United States’ relations with Latin America at 
large during the era of the Good Neighbor Policy. Even at a time when the United States may 
have found itself deeply motivated to attempt to consolidate its control over neighboring regions 
in light of wartime pressures, Latin American interests were not merely subordinated to those of 
the United States in spite of these potential strains on a coequal relationship. Rather than always 
deferring to its hegemonic instincts, the United States found it at least as necessary to appease 
Latin American interests as Latin Americans found it necessary to assuage United States 
concerns about the ostensive role of potentially Axis-aligned residents within its borders. As the 
varying cases demonstrate, these interests could be found in multiple forms, whether stemming 
from domestic prejudice, attempts to manipulate internal factional politics, maintaining positive 
diplomatic relationships with other countries, a desire to accrue material gains, or efforts to gain 
prestige with other countries such as the United States. However, the commonality shared 
amongst all of these Latin American interests that applied to their extension to the Good 
Neighbor renditions was an ability to keep abreast of the United States in determining the form 
that these policies took.  
While the Latin American ability to affect the outcomes it desired as part of the Good 
Neighbor renditions is on full display in these foreign relations documents and other sources 
concerning intergovernmental relations, much information can also be discerned from the 
personal accounts of several of the internees and individuals involved in the Good Neighbour 
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renditions. As the Nottebohm Case represented a balance of both the diplomatic and personal 
aspects of the Good Neighbor renditions, and as the second chapter composed a fuller specific 
examination of these diplomatic aspects, the next section will concern personal accounts. 
 
Chapter Three: Internees 
 While the contents of materials related to diplomacy and policymaking yield substantial 
information on the content and character of the Good Neighbor renditions as concerns their 
mutual derivation from United States and Latin American interests, much information can also 
be inferred from other sources. Not least among such other sources are the personal 
correspondences, memoirs and other testaments from those internees held as part of the Good 
Neighbor renditions, which can often provide significant insight into the circumstances behind 
their deportation, internment and sometime repatriation. This is not least due to the role of these 
sources in documenting the unique circumstances of the individual internees throughout the 
duration of the Good Neighbor renditions, which provide researchers with specific information 
on their engagement with the national authorities of the involved states during their detention. 
From a set of such information, one can extrapolate patterns concerning the principal 
characteristics of the Good Neighbor renditions that can complement information gathered from 
other sources such as foreign relations documents. 
 Notable among memoirs concerning the Good Neighbor rendition program and its 
consequences is Seiichi Higashide’s book, Adios to Tears: The Memoirs of a Japanese-Peruvian 
Internee in U.S. Concentration Camps, wherein Higashide relates his seizure by Peruvian 
authorities and forced deportation to United States internment at the Crystal City camp in Texas. 
The account is similarly revelatory in its treatment of Higashide’s ultimate fate as an internee 
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that opted to remain in the United States due to the circumstances that he was presented with 
accounting for his internment away from his country of residence in Peru. Prior to these events, 
Higashide’s background as a Japanese national is self-examined in depth, as well as his ultimate 
decision to move to Peru. Together, all of these details help to lend significant insight into the 
circumstances of an individual internee caught up in the policy furor that surrounded the Good 
Neighbor renditions and complicated conceptions of one’s identity throughout its duration. 
Seiichi Higashide discusses his family’s relative initial prosperity and the decline thereof 
after moving to Hokkaido in Japan, before delving into his birth into these humble circumstances 
on January 18, 1909 in Otoe Village of the Sorachi District in central Hokkaido.79 Higashide 
documents many of the harsh aspects that dogged his young existence in Hokkaido, such as his 
family’s poverty as laborers and the bitter winter seasons that raised his irk as a child and into his 
young adulthood.80 After nursing ambitions of becoming an architect, Higashide managed to 
attend Hozen Technical School in Tokyo and simultaneously become an apprentice architect, 
which increased his resolve to accumulate further prosperity abroad after reading various 
accounts of Japanese life in the United States, Peru and other foreign countries.81 By 1929, 
Higashide had focused his attentions on immigrating to Peru, and to this end, he acquired a 
                                                          
79 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 9-12: Seiichi Higashide relates that his family was originally from Torikoshi Village in 
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80 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 12-26: As Higashide’s family took up farming in Hokkaido, he details the tribulations 
of their existence associated with laboring on the land and seeking other employment, and his growing 
dissatisfaction with these circumstances as he diligently pursued his education. 
81 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 27-38. 
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passport and learned Spanish before boarding a ship to Peru in 1930, whereupon he arrived at 
Callao in May.82 
Subsequently, Seiichi Higashide describes his incorporation into the Japanese community 
in Peru, where he details experiencing a rocky beginning for his fortunes there as he experienced 
a tenuous engagement with various professions.83 Higashide details early observations of anti-
Japanese sentiment during the Cerro Revolution in Peru, when several Japanese (and Chinese) 
shops were looted, before describing his experience with avoiding a return to Japan under forced 
conscription in the military based on the charge that he had moved to Peru to escape military 
service at the time of Japan’s increasing engagement in Manchuria preceding the Second Sino-
Japanese War.84 However, by 1932, Higashide managed to find stable employment as the teacher 
at a Japanese elementary school in Canete, before being offered the opportunity to take over the 
Otani Company that was then run by Choichi Otani, the president of the parents association of 
the school, an opportunity that Higashide came to gladly accept after being guaranteed joint 
ownership alongside a Mr. Kato, who was an employee of Otani.85 On March 7, 1935, Higashide 
                                                          
82 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 38-44. 
83 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 44-60: Higashide details moving to Canete and working in several non-engineering 
professions, despite his technical experience from the Hozen School in Japan. Seiichi Higashide relates much of his 
time working for the Araki Company in Canete, engaging in such professions as carpentry despite his engineering 
qualifications. 
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to allow him to stay by relating an emotional account of his former circumstances in Japan, though with the Consul 
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85 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 68-74: The Otani Company was composed by a gift shop engaged in the sale of luxury 
items, a barber shop, and a liquor store with an affixed bar. While Higashide was initially reluctant to accept the 
responsibility of managing all three businesses, the prospect of shared ownership with Mr. Kato enticed him to 
accept Choichi Otani’s deal, which Otani offered accounting for his desire to divest of his Peruvian properties and 
engage in business in the new frontier of Manchuria. 
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was wed to Angelica Shizuka, and the newlywed couple moved to Ica and opened his own shop 
after Higashide left the Otani Company and fulfilled his financial obligation to Mr. Otani.86 
In Ica, Seiichi Higashide achieved significant business success as the independent 
proprietor of his own store, Bazar Bienvenida, which flourished and increased Higashide’s 
prospects of achieving significant financial success.87 However, he increasingly had to contend 
with the growing prevalence of anti-Japanese sentiments in Peru concomitant with the lead-up to 
the Second World War, which Higashide attributes both to a pre-standing fixation on the 
concentration of wealth and success in the hands of the recent Japanese immigrant community on 
the part of many Peruvians, who were displaced by the Japanese in some cases, and covert 
United States encouragement of these sentiments through the employment of agents of influence 
throughout Peru.88 After the United States entered the Second World War following the Pearl 
Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, Higashide made his first appearance on a blacklist of 
purported “dangerous Axis nationals” residing in Peru that was sourced from United States 
authorities, forcing him to transfer his properties to Angelica’s name, since she was considered a 
Peruvian citizen by birth and a technicality meant that their marriage was only recognized in 
Japan.89 Increased tribulations plagued Higashide’s family in Peru, as the threat of being 
deported abroad to United States custody was heightened, ostensibly due to United States 
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throughout the country.  
89 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 113-117: Higashide attests that he found out about the revelation from a leak to local 
journalists from El Comercio and La Prensa by a United States agency, rather than from an agency or organization 
affiliated with the Peruvian government, which nevertheless managed to cause him consternation. 
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diplomatic pressures to that effect, but Higashide, his pregnant wife and at that time four children 
managed to remain in Peru up to January 6, 1944.90 
On this date, Seiichi Higashide was arrested by members of the Lima Police 
Headquarters, who sought to deport major Japanese expatriate figures due to the arrival of a ship 
at Callao, and separated from his family.91 Thereafter, Higashide was sent abroad to Panama on 
his birthday of January 18, where he was temporarily detained under United States custody, and 
eventually permitted to solicit his family to join him there alongside other internees, prompting 
his wife to close Bazar Bienvenida and move abroad to join her husband with her five children.92 
Simultaneously, Higashide was transferred to another temporary internment at Camp Kenedy in 
Texas via New Orleans while he awaited his family’s arrival, after which time he was again 
transferred to Crystal City to reside with his family.93 The Higashide family persisted in the 
Crystal City camp until August 1946 after the end of the war; since Peru only permitted seventy-
nine of the internees to return to their country, 364 Peruvians remained in the United States, 
where they were ironically considered to be illegal aliens. This motivated Higashide to petition 
for his family’s ability to remain in the United States to avoid being repatriated to Japan or 
elsewhere, which finally caused the United States to allow Higashide and his family to remain on 
the condition that a guarantor secured them a work contract, which occurred when Seabrook 
Farms of New Jersey permitted the Higashides to work at their food processing facilities.94 
Finally, in January 1949, the Higashides managed to end their employment at Seabrook Farms 
                                                          
90 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 117-132. 
91 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 133-140. 
92 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 140-154. 
93 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 155-165. 
94 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 176-192. 
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and moved to Chicago, where Seiichi and Angelica would reside until 1973, when they moved to 
Hawaii.95 
 When examining the details of the internment of Seiichi Higashide and his family as part 
of the Good Neighbor renditions, one notes that Higashide makes frequent claims that appear to 
be to the effect that the United States was principally responsible for causing the Good Neighbor 
renditions. Notwithstanding Higashide’s remarks on United States involvement in helping to 
compound resentment against Japanese residents in Peru, Higashide mentions the remarks of a 
Peruvian police officer that he encountered in the course of the proceedings over his blacklisted 
status: “It is truly unfortunate, but [your deportation] is the demand of the United States 
government. As you know, we are not in a position to take opposing measures. I ask that you 
understand that point.”96 These sentiments are reiterated by Ica’s provincial governor, 
Commandant Juan Dongo, whom Higashide reports to assert that he is “truly sorry about 
[Higashide’s] situation. Japan is not at war with Peru, yet you have been placed in such a 
situation. Peru, however, is in a weak position and cannot oppose the United States.”97 Both of 
the figures that are making these statements are presented in a rather sympathetic light by 
Higashide, which might predispose one to suppose that these statements represent an authentic 
appraisal of the situation in Peru at the time of the Good Neighbor renditions. However, the 
commentaries of Dongo and the police officer may instead be exceptional for the sympathy that 
they display toward Higashide’s situation, rather than being characteristic of the general response 
of the Peruvian authorities and citizens to the Good Neighbor renditions. What appears more 
telling and convincing on the basis of the established evidence is the fact that Peru would not 
accept the readmission of a majority of those residents interned in the United States following 
                                                          
95 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 193-244. 
96 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 119. 
97 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 121. 
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the end of the war. While such a consideration might prompt the perception of further 
complications to the narrative that Peru was equally as, if not more, complicit in manifesting the 
form of the Good Neighbor renditions, since Peru did demonstrably, if begrudgingly, acquiesce 
to allowing the readmission of seventy-nine internees by 1946, this consideration would likely be 
made in ignorance of the fact that Peru only readmitted certain internees considered to be 
Peruvian citizens by birth, as well as their family members.98 
 Recalling that in the Nottebohm Case, a perceived foreigner was not permitted to 
reacquire legal residency in Guatemala while his native-born nephews were following the end of 
the war, the Peruvian case as demonstrated by Seiichi Higashide does not seem inconsistent with 
the exclusion of residents perceived to retain foreign ties. This comparison casts doubt on the 
idea that Peru, alongside other Latin American states, was not an active agent in shaping the 
contours of the Good Neighbor renditions and their resulting consequences. Such a pattern is 
born out by several other case-studies that illustrate that Latin American countries, such as Peru, 
were active arbiters in the fates of their deported residents, and not merely pawns of United 
States wartime hegemony. This is potently highlighted by the case of Carmen Higa Mochizuki, a 
native-born Japanese-Peruvian whose family was interned at Crystal City and was subsequently 
consigned to immigrating to her parents’ original homeland of Okinawa due to the Peruvian 
government’s refusal to readmit the family in spite of her Peruvian pedigree.99 Such cases as that 
of Mochizuki demonstrate that even native-born internees could be ineligible for consideration as 
                                                          
98 Higashide, Adios to Tears, 177: Peru exploited laws passed in 1940 that prevented Japanese immigration to justify 
not readmitting most of the resident internees, and thereby initially rejected the United States’ requests to resettle 
any of the internees in Peru, even pursuing the matter at the United Nations. Recalling Ley 8526, in addition to the 
laws of 1940, it is clear that there was an evident agenda to disenfranchise Japanese residents in Peru that the Good 
Neighbor renditions helped to facilitate. 
99 Jan Jarboe Russell, The Train to Crystal City: FDR’s Secret Prisoner Exchange Program and America’s Only 
Family Internment Camp During World War II (New York: Scribner, 2015), 260. 
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a readmitted resident of Peru, in addition to Higashide’s account as a foreign-born resident of 
Peru. 
 Obviously, the prevalency of prejudicial anti-Japanese sentiments in Peru is quite 
apparent in the chronicles of Seiichi Higashide and others, and therefore appears very evident as 
a distinct motivation for the form of the Good Neighbor renditions. While the United States may 
have actively endorsed such sentiments, as discussed by Higashide, it is still clear that even if 
this was the case, the United States merely drew upon a pre-standing groundswell of opposition 
to Japanese inclusion in Peruvian society that the Peruvian state subsequently seized upon to help 
advance an agenda of overall ethnic cleansing (i.e. affecting the removal of Japanese residents 
from Peruvian society through the Good Neighbor renditions). However, elsewhere in Latin 
America, other motivations helped to underpin the form of the Good Neighbor renditions, and 
this is demonstrated by other cases that emphasize what often amounted to distinct but 
complementary motives on the part of the United States and Latin America for holding internees. 
One such case is that of the ethnically German Costa Rican, Heidi Gurcke Donald, whose family 
memoirs, entitled We Were Not The Enemy: Remembering the United States’ Latin American 
Civilian Internment Program of World War II, are also quite revelatory in their contents. 
 Heidi Gurcke Donald was the product of a relationship between Werner Gurcke, an 
expatriate German residing with his brother Karl Oskar Gurcke in San José, Costa Rica, and 
Starr Pait, a United States citizen from San Jose, California, that commenced when the former 
was visiting relatives and the latter was undertaking postgraduate studies of Germanic languages 
simultaneously in Germany in 1934. Subsequently, the couple grew closer, prompting Starr Pait 
to move to Costa Rica after marrying Werner Gurcke in the United States in mid-January of 
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1936.100 However, the couple was increasingly forced to contend with those German expatriates 
who sympathized with Nazism in Germany, but made themselves clear that they were opposed to 
the Third Reich and its policies by refusing to participate in an expatriate referendum supporting 
the Anschluss, while also repudiating an attempted Nazi Party takeover of the local German Club 
and embracing antifascist leadership of the club.101 In 1940, Heidi was born to Werner and Starr 
in the midst of a period of mild financial uncertainty on the part of the couple, but the family’s 
adverse circumstances were compounded further when the British blacklist of 1940 named 
Werner and his brother, alongside their business holdings in Costa Rica. This development 
prompted the Gurckes to further dissociate themselves from Nazi sympathizers in Costa Rica, 
while moving to a finca estate in rural San Juan de Tibás that included a coffee plantation and a 
garden.  
However, Werner’s position on the blacklist complicated his ability to conduct business 
in the traditional manner that he was used to, causing him to legally add Starr as a partner as a 
means for companies who owed him money to remit these finances to a United States citizen 
rather than himself.102 Much like Friedrich Nottebohm, despite Werner Gurcke’s cooperation in 
registering as a resident alien with the office of the secretary of state of Costa Rica, Gurcke was 
covertly labeled to be “one of the most dangerous German nationals in the country” in an internal 
memo by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The FBI would open a similar 
file on Starr Pait when it was discovered that she was the spouse and business partner of Werner, 
a fact which was hinted at by Werner’s discovery that the Costa Rican press was now including 
                                                          
100 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, xviii and 1-15: Werner and Karl Oscar were originally prompted to move to 
Costa Rica from their hometown of Hamburg, Germany due to experiencing the hardships associated with rising 
inflation rates following the First World War, which motivated a long-term disenchantment with Germany’s 
economic state on their part later on, causing the brothers to immigrate to Costa Rica in 1929. 
101 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 16-18. 
102 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 20-25: This was the same British blacklist that prompted scrutiny over the 
Nottebohms and their business ventures in Central America, and which similarly prompted the surveillance of the 
Gurckes by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 
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his wife in published business blacklists. As the Gurckes became increasingly harassed by Costa 
Rican authorities, the situation was only worsened when a German submarine coincidentally 
torpedoed a ship near Limón, Costa Rica, which ultimately caused the arrest and detention of 
Werner and his brother Karl Oskar under conditions of domestic internment in July 1942. By 
early December, Starr, Heidi and her sister Ingrid were also held under detention at the 
repurposed German Club building.103  
 On January 26, a ship bearing the Gurcke family and other Costa Rican internees 
departed from Puntarenas en route to the port of San Pedro, California.104 After being 
temporarily held at the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) facility in San Pedro for 
interrogation, the Gurcke family was transferred by train to the Crystal City family internment 
camp in Texas.105 During their internment in Crystal City from 1943-1944, Werner and Starr 
maintained their vehement anti-Nazi attitudes, in contrast to some other prisoners, and ultimately 
even grew distant from Karl Oskar due to his increasing identification with the Third Reich 
while under internment in Crystal City.106 While Karl Oskar eventually consented to being 
repatriated to Germany, along with his own family, Werner remained firmly opposed to 
repatriation to Germany and vouched for his innocence in spite of a series of spurious charges 
arrayed against him.107 Finally, Werner, Starr and their children were released from Crystal City 
in May 1944 while remaining “internees at large,” after which time Werner found employment 
                                                          
103 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 26-36: In the midst of this activity, Heidi’s sister Ingrid was born in 1941. 
104 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 41-43. 
105 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 45-50. 
106 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 52-60. 
107 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 62-66: These charges included Werner and Starr’s membership in the German 
Club and Werner’s prior position as a treasurer from 1934-1935; a small though likely unwitting donation he made 
to Winterhilfe (Winter Help), a charity benefitting those of German ethnicity who were in need that was occasionally 
exploited by operatives of the Third Reich to facilitate their activities in Latin America; his membership in a 
German mutual benefit society, the Unterstützungverein, in the early 1920s; a list of the addresses of businesses and 
associates of Werner abroad that was probably intentionally tampered with to make Werner seem more suspect; and 
his distant relation to the family of C.W. Lohrengel and his son, for whose firm he originally worked. 
52 
 
in Santa Cruz, California, before the authorities once again demanded that he relocate further 
inland.108 
 After the war’s end in August 1945, Werner and Starr considered returning to Costa Rica 
with their family, but were beset by difficulties, as the United States resolved to permit Latin 
American countries to either determine the fate of their own residents interned abroad or consent 
to the United States’ discretion regarding the fate of the internees. In the absence of any 
consistent official position undertaken by the Costa Rican government, the United States 
threatened to deport Werner, Starr and their children to Germany in a possible forced repatriation 
due to their postwar illegal alien status. However, following hearings on the matter, United 
States authorities ultimately suspended the attempt at repatriation of the Gurcke family to 
Germany.109 Eventually, the Gurcke family opted to remain in the United States due to 
cultivating business ties through Werner’s cork-import business there, though Heidi asserts that 
her father often longed to return to his residency in Costa Rica.110 
 Heidi Gurcke Donald attributes her family’s rendition and internment in the United States 
to three principal factors: the United States’ concern with the potential security threat posed by 
residents with perceived ethnic affiliations to the Axis powers in the Western Hemisphere, the 
United States’ desire to neutralize economic competition on the part of these residents, and the 
United States’ aspiration to utilize the internees as bargaining chips to be traded with the Axis 
powers for other prisoners of war held by these states and their co-belligerents.111 While the 
United States may have played a proactive role in motivating the Good Neighbor renditions on 
the basis of the latter two motivations, it cannot be held exclusively or even necessarily 
                                                          
108 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 68-73. 
109 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 75-81. 
110 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 83-86. 
111 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 93-99: Heidi Gurcke Donald cites several internal United States government 
documents, memorandums and resolutions to reinforce these conclusions. 
53 
 
responsible for cases such as those which confronted the Gurcke family. While interpretations of 
the bulk of the evidence collected on the Gurckes preceding their internment by United States 
authorities and collated by the United States military attaché Lieutenant Colonel E. Andino show 
an evident obsession with Werner and Starr Gurcke’s economic activities, their treatment as a 
direct physical security threat is eschewed by the content of the evidence arrayed against them.112 
Similarly, the repatriation aspect of the case of the Gurcke family is not inconsistent with 
evidence from other cases such as the Nottebohms, except perhaps inasmuch as it incorporates 
Heidi Gurcke Donald more pointed implication that the repatriation process was potentially 
coercive rather than voluntary. The fact that the Gurckes were subjected to hearings much as 
other internees like the Nottebohms were, and had the opportunity to successfully defend their 
convictions that they should not be repatriated to a current or former Axis country, confirms the 
trend of evidence indicating that the United States only endorsed the repatriations and prisoner 
exchanges as a periphery measure, and took the internees’ preferences into account.113 
 While the United States did find it prudent to render, intern and nearly repatriate the 
Gurcke family to their custody for their own demonstrable reasons, it was through the willing 
acquiescence of Costa Rica that this was permitted to occur. Recalling that Costa Rica 
specifically exempted Italian families from the same treatment that German Costa Ricans such as 
the Gurckes were often subjected to as part of the Good Neighbor renditions and associated 
policies and refused to place the Spanish minister ostensibly abetting Italian interests in Costa 
Rica under the substantive scrutiny that the United States desired, it is clear that Costa Rica was 
not merely subordinated to United States pressure in the Good Neighbor renditions, as Heidi 
Gurcke Donald often seems to imply. Indeed, Costa Rica, through inaction or unresponsiveness 
                                                          
112 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 22 and 63. 
113 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 79-80. 
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at a time when the United States had specifically resolved to defer to the interests of Latin 
American countries on the matter, effectively consigned the Gurckes to near-repatriation to 
Germany. It is probable that the Costa Ricans may have perceived Germans such as the Gurckes 
as a tangible security threat due to military actions in their vicinity, such as the ship sinking off 
of Limón that directly preceded the arrest of the Gurckes and others. Whatever is the case, it is 
baldly apparent that Costa Rica had agency in actively facilitating their own interests through the 
Good Neighbor renditions in a manner that was complementary to the United States’ own 
interests in pursuing the program. 
 What the cases of Seiichi Higashide, the family of Heidi Gurcke Donald, and others most 
fundamentally illustrate is that the Good Neighbor renditions were mutually molded by the 
United States and their Latin American collaborators in Peru, Costa Rica and elsewhere. Such 
policies were pursued in the mutual interests of both the United States and Latin American 
countries. The extent to which one can analogize the specific case of the Good Neighbor 
renditions to the broader Good Neighbor Policy in inferring the character of relations between 
the United States and Latin American countries is quite significant. One might assume that Latin 
American countries were practically coerced into helping the United States facilitate the 
rendition and internment of residents that were ostensibly perceived to be potential security 
threats, and that the Good Neighbor Policy would thereby be at its most transparent stage as a 
seeming justification for United States hegemonic control over the workings of the Western 
Hemisphere. However, such assumptions are complicated by the evidence sourced from 
individual internees, in tandem with additional evidence. In these cases, internees were forcibly 
inducted as participants in the Good Neighbor renditions due to the selectively collaborative 
efforts of both the United States and Latin American states. 
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 What the willing collaboration between the United States and Latin American countries 
in bringing about the Good Neighbor renditions as exemplified in these cases also highlights is 
that policies of mutual or coequal engagement between the United States and Latin American 
governments have not always benefited residents. Even in moments of eased tension between the 
United States and Latin America, as occurred during the Good Neighbor Policy, average citizens 
and residents may find themselves at the mercy of mutually capricious interests, rather than 
benefit from such a rapprochement as the Good Neighbor Policy constituted. This is especially 
applicable to those populations who were disenfranchised or fell into a legal grey area on 
society’s fringes accounting for their perceived foreign status. Therefore, the Good Neighbor 
renditions are a poignant illustration of the effects that even seemingly well-intentioned ploys at 
diplomatic engagement can have on the average person. 
 
Epilogue  
 The totality of the evidence presented herein strongly suggests that the Good Neighbor 
renditions were ultimately a mutualistic enterprise that benefitted the United States and Latin 
American governments in complementary though divergent ways, if frequently to the detriment 
of civilians residing in Latin America. This nuanced understanding of the Good Neighbor 
renditions complicates many revisionist assumptions about the broader content of the Good 
Neighbor Policy. As a series of initiatives adopted under a fevered climate of ostensive wartime 
necessity understood to have been experienced in the United States, the renditions should 
seemingly epitomize the Good Neighbor Policy at its most coercive for Latin America, 
potentially exposing the Good Neighbor Policy as a thin veneer for United States hegemonic 
exploitation in the region. Nevertheless, the accumulated evidence on the Good Neighbor 
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renditions casts doubt on this narrative, which in turn complicates wider views about the 
diplomatic character of the Good Neighbor Policy as a platform to advance United States 
domination in general. 
 Within the historiography on the Good Neighbor Policy, a prominent source of debate is 
fixated upon whether the rhetorical assertion of an improvement in the United States’ diplomatic 
relations with Latin American governments was an authentic aspiration of the Good Neighbor 
Policy, or whether the Good Neighbor Policy was merely another cover for the United States’ 
exploitation of Latin America. This gets to the heart of an even broader discussion regarding 
whether the Good Neighbor Policy better embodied the more benevolent rhetorical 
characteristics of the Monroe Doctrine, or whether the Good Neighbor Policy was more 
emblematic of its Roosevelt Corollary.114 Scholars such as Peter Smith have contended that the 
Good Neighbor Policy was a representation of the latter category, arguing that “within the 
context of the Imperial Era, the Good Neighbor policy can be seen not as a departure from past 
practices but as the culmination of trends in U.S. policy toward the region.  In effect, FDR’s 
stance reflected a hardheaded sense of realpolitik that promoted and protected the long-standing 
U.S. quest for hegemony throughout the hemisphere.”115 This viewpoint conflicts with the image 
that contemporaneous policymakers tended to articulate with respect to the Good Neighbor 
Policy, but has gained significant academic traction approximately within the last two decades, 
and it promotes the notion that the sociopolitical circumstances of Latin America are most 
                                                          
114 Robert J. Allison, History in Dispute, Volume 3 - American Social and Political Movements, 1900-1945: Pursuit 
of Progress (Detroit, MI: St. James Press, 2000), 45-53: In this context, the more benevolent rhetorical 
characteristics of the Monroe Doctrine represent the assertion that this policy initiative was applied by the United 
States as a genuine means of shielding the Western Hemisphere from foreign interference in a manner that enhanced 
the benevolent diplomatic closeness of the United States with countries in Latin America, as implied in the original 
language articulated as part of the Monroe Doctrine, whereas the Roosevelt Corollary emphasized the deployment of 
United States power or pressure to achieve political outcomes therein that were favorable to the United States, even 
if these may have arisen at the expense of its Latin American neighbors. 
115 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 65-66. 
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fundamentally premised on the pressure and intervention of the United States concerning its 
regional affairs. Such an idea composes the embodiment of a “colonial matrix” perceived by the 
likes of Walter Mignolo, whose contention that the very moniker “Latin America” is a 
contrivance on the part of Western interests speaks to the maintenance of a strict imperialistic 
hierarchy wherein Latin elites and their subject peoples, such as Indians and Africans, have been 
necessarily consigned to a subordinate status in their relations with the United States and the 
Global North at large.116 
 Eminent scholars on the Good Neighbor renditions have often claimed that the Good 
Neighbor renditions represent either a reversal away from the reciprocal aspects of the Good 
Neighbor renditions or highlight that these reciprocal aspects were transparently inauthentic from 
the outset. This includes the researcher Max Paul Friedman, who alleges that  
 officials in Washington were able to prevail upon their Latin American counterparts to 
 collaborate in the [rendition] program only by violating both the letter and spirit of the 
 Good Neighbor policy. Although it has somehow escaped notice, the deportation 
 program – which was the most direct manifestation of wartime anti-Axis policy in Latin 
 America, and which heralded the return of [United States] interventionism – should be at 
 the center of any history of the war and Latin America, and especially of U.S.-Latin 
 American relations in this era.117 
 
Likewise, historian Greg Robinson attributes the principal motivations for deporting internees in 
Latin America abroad under United States custody to US State Department pressures, especially 
following the purported release of several prisoners who were alleged to have bribed their 
domestic jailers in Latin America.118 Such sentiments of principal United States culpability have 
also been shared by those who were personally affected by the Good Neighbor renditions 
                                                          
116 Mignolo, The Idea of Latin America, x-xx: Specifically, Mignolo discusses the importance of “Latinidad” as an 
identity that functions to cause the traditional Creole elite of Iberian descent in the Americas to internalize attitudes 
that rank them as inferior to Anglo-Americans, but simultaneously erase and demote the identities of Indians, Afro-
Americans and other subject peoples. 
117 Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors, 3. 
118 Greg Robinson, A Tragedy of Democracy: Japanese Confinement in North America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009), 149. 
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themselves, as Heidi Gurcke Donald attests in her commentaries that “the United States [was] 
pivotal in the creation and administration of the Latin-American program. U.S. policies were 
motivated by three concerns: national and hemispheric security, economic rivalry for Latin-
American markets, and the third, least savory purpose—gathering captives to use for barter with 
Axis countries holding American prisoners.”119 Similarly, the popular press is rife with 
misconceptions of the relationship dynamic between the United States and Latin America, such 
as an article from The Guardian which states that “larger countries like Mexico, Chile and 
Argentina resisted the demand to deport their citizens, but that was not an option for [a] small 
Central American nation.”120 However, much of the evidence points to complications in the 
narrative that the United States was exclusively or even principally responsible for the shape that 
the Good Neighbor renditions ultimately took. 
  On the contrary, the assemblage of evidence presented herein suggests that Latin 
American governments and even the societies that they represented played an instrumental role 
in determining the form of the Good Neighbor renditions, alongside their United States 
counterparts. Even in one of the regions that has historically tended to be most vulnerable to the 
hegemonic impositions of the United States – Central America – the United States was 
confronted with various nation-states that indicated an ability to formulate their own policies and 
insist on their implementation within the context of the Good Neighbor renditions. Countries 
including Costa Rica and El Salvador were able to remain aloof of possible United States 
pressures that they found objectionable (such as attempts to secure certain finances or desires to 
retain certain internees independent of Latin American requests to secure their return). This 
demonstrated that, while Latin American countries often found United States interests to be 
                                                          
119 Donald, We Were Not The Enemy, 93. 
120 Zach Dyer, "Lost Story of German Latin Americans Interned During Second World War," The Guardian, 
December 5, 2014. 
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amenable to their own policy goals, they were not necessarily beholden to the United States and 
were even able to manipulate the implementation of the Good Neighbor renditions. Various 
Latin American countries, including those with less relative power such as Cuba, were able to 
maintain their own internment programs, rather than yielding to any alleged pressure to render 
United States civilians abroad.  
A host of Latin American countries did not feel obligated to participate in the Good 
Neighbor renditions at all, and in some cases, this even extended to a lack of will to maintain 
their own internment programs, as was the case in Chile and Argentina. Latin American states 
that did participate had reasons that were distinct from United States pressure for doing so. While 
hemispheric security may have been a raison d’être for the Good Neighbor renditions as Heidi 
Gurcke Donald and others contend, this was not necessarily premised specifically on United 
States concerns about security. For example, the case of Costa Rica’s detention of several 
German internees including members of the Gurcke family being preceded by the torpedoing of 
a maritime vessel by German forces is echoed in the case of the sinking of the SS Potrero del 
Llano and the SS Faja de Oro by German U-Boats in May 1942, which prompted Mexico to take 
measures to mobilize against perceived security threats associated with the Axis powers in a 
declaration of war. However, since Latin American countries did not tend to be dogged by the 
seeming presence of such security threats, many other motivations that did not align with 
purported United States objectives likely underpinned Latin American countries’ involvement in 
the Good Neighbor renditions. In El Salvador and Costa Rica, there is evidence that the Good 
Neighbor renditions were co-opted for the purpose of asserting domestic political initiatives, 
often to enhance the powers of contemporaneous administrations such as that of President 
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in El Salvador and President Rafael Calderón Guardia in 
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Costa Rica.121 Other domestic agendas that the Good Neighbor renditions helped to advance 
included expropriation of assets and land reform, as illustrated in Guatemala. Where the 
incentive of prisoner exchanges was concerned, there is also evidence to indicate that Latin 
American states benefitted from prisoner exchanges alongside, if not more than, the United 
States. This is notable in the frequent conditionality that Latin American states attempted to 
cultivate with the United States in rendering internees for the purpose of repatriation in exchange 
for their desired nationals held abroad. Finally, some Latin American states such as Peru showed 
an inclination to deport internees to assuage sources of historic prejudice within their countries 
over those perceived to be of different ethnicities or nationalities. 
However, a more coequal relationship between the United States and Latin American 
countries exhibited during the course of the Good Neighbor renditions did not necessarily signify 
circumstances that benefitted many Latin Americans. The cases of Friedrich Nottebohm, Seiichi 
Higashide and Heidi Gurcke Donald, among others, demonstrate that several residents of Latin 
America, including several who were citizens by birth, were collateral victims whose existences 
were often upended in the interest of certain agendas that were being advanced to justify the 
Good Neighbor renditions. Therefore, any quibbles should not be over whether many Latin 
American residents, particularly those of Japanese, German and Italian extraction, were 
adversely affected by the Good Neighbor renditions, but over whether or not these adverse 
effects were mutually generated by domestic and foreign agendas, an answer which herein is 
responded to in the affirmative. Resultantly, one can conclude that the Good Neighbor 
renditions, and by extension the diplomatic endeavors associated with the Good Neighbor Policy, 
were not always conducted to the benefit of every Latin American, but that this does not 
conversely imply that Latin American governments or other members of Latin American society 
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were always the mutual recipients of victimization generated by the United States’ relations 
therewith. 
The extent to which this accounting of the Good Neighbor renditions emphasizes the 
agency of Latin Americans in diplomatic interactions with the United States and other foreigners 
counter to revisionist assumptions about ostensibly benevolent periods of contact with Latin 
America has utility in deconstructing assumptions about the overall character of United States 
relations with Latin America in many different contexts as well. While the United States’ 
interventionism in Latin America has been prevalent in different periods of history, one should 
make an effort to suspend assumptions that Latin American countries have not demonstrated an 
ability to resist United States pressure even during times of heightened intervention in Latin 
American affairs consistent with the Monroe Doctrine. In this vein, even cases wherein the 
United States’ interference in internal Latin American affairs is well-documented, complications 
to the notion that the United States necessarily predominates in these interactions of interference 
arise, as exemplified by the case of Chile, which retained nationalization of copper after 1973 
despite the respondent economic boycott and manipulation of Chilean politics by the United 
States that ultimately resulted in General Augusto Pinochet’s accession to power and the 
adoption of neoliberal policies favorable to the United States from that same year onward.122 
Using the Good Neighbor renditions as a template for perceiving the mutualistic characteristics 
of the United States’ relations with Latin America, and vice-versa, can therefore be immensely 
helpful in examining the content and character of such relations up to the contemporary period. 
 Collectively, all of this information demonstrates the inherent value in discerning the 
mutualistic aspects of the Good Neighbor renditions, and how these aspects reflected on the 
                                                          
122 Fernando Coz Léniz, "Histories of Nationalization and Privatization: The Cases of the Chilean and Zambian 
Copper Industries"; Jack Devine, "What Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup Against Allende, and the 
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overall ability of Latin American countries to negotiate selective implementations of the 
renditions that benefitted their policy goals and outlooks in ways that were distinguished from 
the United States’ desires and ambitions. By achieving this understanding of the Good Neighbor 
renditions, as an important part of the Good Neighbor Policy, one arrives at a more substantive 
apprehension of the factors that characterized the United States’ relations with Latin America 
under the framework of the Good Neighbor Policy as well. By giving insight into this dynamic, 
one realizes the extent to which several Latin Americans have been able to actively articulate 
their distinct interests on a global stage, whereas other Latin Americans have suffered from these 
interactions partly as the sometime result of other Latin Americans’ connivance with foreign 
interests, as occurred in several instances during the Good Neighbor renditions. Much of this 
context thereby helps to account for the United States’ relations with Latin America in many 
other historical periods, which enhances the overall diplomatic historiography on the subject in 
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